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Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments and
Questions on Law and Narrative*
Carol Weisbrod**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article builds on the familiar point that a significant
difference exists between law and narrative. While in some con-
texts we may stress the complexities and pluralistic aspects of
law, it seems that, at least by contrast to literature, or, more
expansively, narrative, law stresses a single integrated hierarchi-
cal vision and a single authoritative voice. Law and narrative are
always in tension to the extent that a major emphasis in law is
on clarity and reduction to a single vision, while a major point in
narrative, both in the telling and in the questions we can ask
about the telling, is ambiguity and complexity. Law's idea of
truth is captured in the oath for witnesses: "Do you swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?"' Narra-
tive has a different sense: "Is this true? Is this the whole story? I
think not."'2
The current scholarly interest in narrative raises difficult
questions for law, especially to the extent that legal scholarship
* o 1991, Carol Weisbrod.
** Professor of Law, The University of Connecticut School of Law. This piece has
its origins in a reading of the Book of Esther at the Cover Public Interest Law Confer-
ence, Peterborough, New Hampshire, March 1990.
Many people have been consulted in connection with this work, but I would like to
particularly acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Milner Ball, Elizabeth
Clark, Hendrik Hartog, Carolyn Jones, Richard Kay, Sanford Levinson, Leon Lipson,
Pamela Sheingorn, Aviam Soifer, Eva Weisbrod, and Zipporah Wiseman. I would also
like to thank participants in the symposium on family law (held in October 1990 at Brig-
ham Young University) for their assistance. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the
useful conversations on narrative which I had at the University of Texas when this paper
was delivered there at a faculty symposium in February 1991.
1. In other ways, law is not of course focused on truth, but has many objectives, only
one of which is truth. For an overview on what is truth, see W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW,
LANGUAGE AND ETHICS, ch. 6 (1972).
2. R WILSON, RIPLEY BOGEL 120 (1989). Some versions of the idea that one "tells
one's story" seem often thin and linear, like the law's idea that one tells where one was
on the night of the tenth. See Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony, Theories of State and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REv. 985 (1990) (similar point in another context).
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is considered normative. Narrative has a function in law reform;
it gives access to material which social science does not. This
function is of considerable importance, particularly in the case
of family law. The relationship between law and narrative may
be peculiarly close in the area of family law, where judicial opin-
ions may possess aspects not merely of narrative or story telling,
but of a particularly intense form of story telling that involves
the shaping of personal history and private life. But while narra-
tive is, in its own way, as important as the statistics on non-
support or child abuse, narrative is harder to deal with than sta-
tistics. For example, unless it is constructed for that precise pur-
pose, as a form of rhetorical argument, narrative will not gener-
ally testify unequivocally either to the problem or the legal
solution.
This article contains six parts. Part II of this paper uses a
biblical narrative of marital break-down, the story of Vashti
from the Book of Esther, to raise a number of general difficulties
in establishing narrative meaning. Part III is based largely on
extracts from women's narratives on marriage and divorce, and
is offered as one way of describing the relationship between law
and narrative. Focusing on the history of divorce as a case study,
this part of the article reads law and narrative in a way that
stresses the parallels between the law's image of marriage and
divorce and the social image of marriage and divorce as drawn
from the narratives. Part IV outlines some problems of narrative
as reformist argument. Part V relates narrative to legal plural-
ism, noting that the conventional definition of law excludes
other "law" which might be relevant to the actual experience of
marriage and divorce. Part V suggests that, while narrative may
be of some use in the formation of state frameworks regarding
marriage and the family, it is more useful, initially and descrip-
tively, as a method of exploring the multiplicity of family law
norms existing within the society.
As this article is based on a small number of women's narra-
tives,3 at least two issues arise. The first issue is raised by the
3. There are, of course, difficulties with narrative in relation to feminism specifi-
cally. Some have to do with traditional images of women. Diaries and other private writ-
ings may in fact work to reinforce the image of women as private and expressive rather
than rational and analytic. Thus it has been noted that
present feminist theory encourages private-hence presumably "natu-
ral"-writings of women. But even diaries and letters are written according to
rules. And such "expansion" could well be understood rather as the contraction
of the idea of writing, and an interaction of the stereotype of woman as a
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restriction of this article to a focus on women's stories. This has
been done because marriage has a relationship to women and
the problems of feminism which is different from its relationship
to men. The traditional marriage contract of most women was
highly unsatisfactory in a number of ways. Even today it re-
mains unclear whether formally changing the contract while re-
taining the concepts of husband and wife is possible. In Con-
greve's Way of the World, the woman expects to "dwindle into a
wife" even after arranging for a prenuptial contract.4 The
women's movement historically focused on freer and even free
divorce. Today the economic consequences of divorce remain a
women's issue. Women's history cannot be done without a his-
tory of marriage, including divorce. It was clearly understood by
some first generation American feminists that the issue of mar-
riage was central to the question of women's equality. One femi-
wholly private, purely expressive being.
Baym, The Madwoman and Her Languages: Why I Don't Do Feminist Literary Theory,
in FEMINIST ISSUES IN LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP 45-46 (S. Benstock ed. 1987). For a descrip-
tion of the characteristics of slave narratives, and a contrast with the narrative of a free
black woman in the North who became a minister, see Foster, Neither Auction Block
nor Pedestal: The Life and Religious Experience of Jarena Lee as Coloured Lady, in
THE FEMALE AUTOGRAPH (D. Stanton ed. 1984). This 1836 narrative is a spiritual autobi-
ography, in the tradition of conversion narratives: "In the manner of the Puritan and
Quaker conversion narratives, it contains a confession to sin, a testimony of conversion,
and demonstrations of subsequent commitment to God's work." Id. at 128. What are the
conventions of late 20th century law review narratives?
Similarly, this feminist emphasis on narrative and experience embraces an aspect of
women's situation in the world which, in some communities, particularly that of intellec-
tual elites, traditionally evidenced the intellectual inferiority of women. C.S. Lewis writes
of this:
Wherever the men meet, the women must come too. The men have learned to
live among ideas. They know what discussion, proof and illustration mean. A
woman who has had merely school lessons and has abandoned soon after mar-
riage whatever tinge of "culture" they gave her-whose reading is the women's
Magazines and whose general conversation is almost wholly narrative-cannot
really enter such a circle.
C. LEWIS, THE FOUR LoVEs 69-70 (1960).
4. For a discussion of the Congreve contract, see J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MAR-
RIAGE 38 (1982). In general, Bernard argues that modern American marriage is more sat-
isfactory for men than for women and that marriage should be analyzed in terms of two
marriages, his and hers. For an example of a husband's narrative, see J. EPSTEIN, DI-
VORCED IN AMERICA 11-12 (1975) (discussing "reverting to autobiography").
5. See Basch, Relief in the Premises: Divorce as a Woman's Remedy in New York
and Indiana, 1815-1870, 8 LAW & HISTORY REV. 1 (1990); Clark, Matrimonial Bonds:
Slavery and Divorce in Nineteenth Century America, 8 LAW & HISTORY REV. 25 (1990);
Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspec-
tives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (S. Sugarman & H. Kay
eds. 1991).
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nist writer explained: "The solemn and profound question of
marriage . . . is of more vital consequence to woman's welfare,
reaches down to a deeper depth in woman's heart and more
thoroughly constitutes the core of the woman's movement, than
any such superficial and fragmentary question as woman
suffrage."
6
The second issue is that this article is not monographic but
impressionistic. It is quite unlike, for example, Caroll Smith Ro-
senberg's study of nineteenth century marriage, based on the
reading of thousands of letters and diaries.' Rather, this article
uses narratives to support conventional historical interpretations
and to suggest that other insights might be obtained by a more
thorough use of narrative.
Finally, this is an article about the use of narrative texts. It
is not itself a narrative text.
II. VASHTI
On the seventh day, when the king was merry with wine, he
ordered Mehuman, Bizzetha, Harbona, Bigtha, Abagtha,
Zethar, and Carcas, the seven eunuchs in attendance on King
Ahasuerus, to bring Queen Vashti before the king wearing a
royal diadem, to display her beauty to the peoples and the
officials; for she was a beautiful woman. But Queen Vashti re-
fused to come at the king's command conveyed by the
eunuchs. The king was greatly incensed, and his fury burned
within him.
Then the king consulted the sages learned in procedure. (For
it was the royal practice [to turn] to all who were versed in
law and precedent. His closest advisers were Carshena, She-
thar, Admatha. Tarshish, Meres, Marsena, and Memucan, the
seven ministers of Persia and Media who had access to the
royal presence and occupied the first place in the kingdom.)
"What, [he asked,] "shall be done, according to law, to Queen
Vashti for failing to obey the command of King Ahasuerus
conveyed by the eunuchs?"
Thereupon Memucan declared in the presence of the king and
the ministers: "Queen Vashti has committed an offense not
only against Your Majesty but also against all the officials
6. W. O'NEIL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE 19-20 (1969) (quoting Bullard, What Flag Shall
We Fly?, Revolution, Oct. 27, 1870, at 264).
7. Smith-Rosenberg, The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations Between
Women in Nineteenth-Century America, 1 SIGNS 1 (1975) (arguing that 19th century
marriage allowed significant emotional attachments-to women-outside of marriage).
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and against all the peoples in all the provinces of King Ahas-
uerus. For the queen's behavior will make all wives despise
their husbands, as they reflect that King Ahasuerus himself
ordered Queen Vashti to be brought before him, but she would
not come. This very day the ladies of Persia and Media, who
have heard of the queen's behavior, will cite it to all Your
Majesty's officials, and there will be no end of scorn and
provocation!
"If it please Your Majesty, let a royal edict be issued by you,
and let it be written into the laws of Persia and Media, so
that it cannot be abrogated, that Vashti shall never enter the
presence upon another who is more worthy than she. Then
will the judgment executed by Your Majesty resound
throughout your realm, vast though it is; and all wives will
treat their husbands with respect, high and low alike."
The proposal was approved by the king and the ministers,
and the king did as Memucan proposed. Dispatches were sent
to all the provinces of the king, to every province in its own
script and to every nation in its own language, that every man
should wield authority in his home and speak the language of
his own people.8
The story of Vashti is told in the Book of Esther, which
does not use God's name, and a book about which it might be
said that no one, including Esther, is above criticism. The Book
of Esther and the celebration of Purim, concentrates on Esther,
the girl who saves her people. Another reading of the Book of
Esther might focus on Vashti.
What can be said about Vashti? To begin with, she does not
tell her own story. The narrative is told by someone much more
interested in the processes of men than of women. Vashti's story
is not only told from the outside, but it is told from the outside
without empathy. The narrator does not suggest that he knows
Vashti's thoughts or motives in refusing to obey the king's
command.
Thus, there have been many discussions of Vashti's motives,
attempts by centuries of commentators to deal with the text's
failure to give a reason for Vashti's conduct. One suggestion ' was
8. JEWISH PUBLICATIONS SOCIETY, THE WRITINGS 405-06 (1982) (new translation of
the Book of Esther).
9. See L. PATON, THE BOOK OF ESTHER 96 (1908) ("There is no noble character in
the book."). Fackenheim refers to a "curious Midrash" which says that the only festival
to be celebrated in the world to come will be Purim, which has at its center the Book of
Esther. E. FACKENHEIM, WHAT IS JUDAISM? 274 (1987).
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that Vashti did not come because it was contrary to Persian cus-
tom for her to be present, However, "[i]t was not Persian custom
to seclude the women as in the modern Orient. The Queen could
be present at banquets. . . . [The suggestion] that Vashti re-
fused to come because it was contrary to Persian custom is
therefore untenable. . ". . 0 Another idea is that Vashti was
commanded to appear naked, a version which assimilates this
story to the account in Herodotus of Candaulas, King of Lydia.1
The text, however, makes no reference to this. Moreover, if this
were true it would give Vashti a good reason, or even an excuse,
for not coming. Thus, the nakedness explanation had to also be
rejected, at least within the rabbinic tradition. The rabbis
"could not see why such a shameless creature as Vashti was
painted by tradition should be unwilling to come even in this
condition.' 1 2 Other explanations were offered. Perhaps Vashti
"had a disfigurement which she was unwilling to reveal.' 3 Per-
haps "she refused because she thought her feast as good as that
of [Ahasuerus] and was unwilling to depreciate hers by gracing
his.' 1 4 Others thought "that the refusal was due to the fact that
the men were drunk, and that Vashti feared to be insulted by
them. However, the women were guarded by eunuchs when they
attended banquets . . .; and surely a Persian queen must have
been accustomed to the spectacle of drunkenness."' 5 Paton con-
cludes that the author of Esther apparently regards the refusal
as "merely a whim, for which he offers no explanation. 1 6 Femi-
nist readings of Vashti have assumed that, whatever the reason
for Vashti's refusal, it was heroic. As a result, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton included Vashti among the positive female images in
her discussion of the Bible.' 7 She wrote: "The Bible cannot be
10. L. PATON, supra note 9, at 150.
11. Bickerman, tracing the Candaulus theme, said that "[a]ccording to the rabbis,
Vashti told the king '[I]f I come before the lords of the kingdom they will kill you and
marry me."' E. BIcK RMAN, FouR STRANGE BOOKS OF THE BIBLE 185 (1967).
12. L. PATON, supra note 9, at 150.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citation omitted).
16. Id. A later commentator offers as an explanation that only courtesans attended
the banquets when the men were drinking. Therefore, "[b]y coming to the King's party,
Vashti would lose face, she would degrade herself to the position of a concubine." E.
BICKERMAN, supra note 11, at 186. It is an explanation based on feminist dignity, but it
does not reinforce ideas of female solidarity.
17. E. STANTON, THE ORIGINAL FEMINIST ATTACK ON THE BIBLE (1874) [hereinafter
THE WOMAN'S BIBLE]. See Jones, Feminist Views of Exodus: Narrative of Liberation or
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accepted or rejected as a whole, its teachings are varied and its
lessons differ widely from each other. In criticising [sic] the pec-
cadilloes of Sarah, Rebecca and Rachel, we would not shadow
the virtues of Deborah, Huldah and Vashti."' Stanton saw
Vashti's refusal as having a reason. Vashti, who is said in the
Woman's Bible to have refused to come with "dignity," is the
model of the woman Stanton argued for all her life--the woman
who refused to countenance the drunkenness of men. 19 Stanton
interpolates this sentence in the Vashti story. Vashti said: "Go
tell the king I will not come; dignity and modesty alike forbid.
20
Stanton then quotes Tennyson:
Oh, Vashti! noble Vashti!
Summoned forth, she kept her state,
And left the drunken king to brawl
In Shushan underneath his palms.
21
A second commentator in the Woman's Bible offers a differ-
ent reason for Vashti's behavior. Here it is as if Vashti's refusal
was noble in itself; Vashti was the "woman who dared" to diso-
bey her husband.22 In fact, she may have known his condition,
Oppression? (Book Review) 1986 UTAH L. REV. 297 (regarding Stanton and the Bible,
especially Exodus). See also A. KRADITOR, IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 79
(1971).
18. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY, CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS,
SPEECHES 233 (E. DuBois ed. 1981). [hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES].
19. In the Jewish tradition, drunkenness is associated with Purim in the sense that
one is supposed to be intoxicated. See E. FACKENHEIM, supra note 9.
20. THE WOMAN'S BIBLE, supra note 17, at 85. See also Address by Anna Shaw to
the Woman's National Council (Feb. 25, 1891) (reprinted in Woman's J., Mar. 7, 1891, at
1-2, col. 3-4).
21. THE WOMAN'S BIBLE, supra note 17, at 86 (an almost accurate quotation from A.
TENNYSON, The Princess, in POEMS OF TENNYSON 261 (1929) (probably largely
remembered today through its parody, Princess Ida)).
22. THE WOMAN'S BIBLE, supra note 17. The stress on dignity and modesty can re-
sult in a reading in which Vashti's disobedience exemplifies the true duties of a Christian
wife. See the discussion of Vashti in H. LOCKYER, THE WOMEN OF THE BIBLE 165-67
(1975). "A wife need not and may not obey her husband in what opposes God's laws and
the laws of feminine honor and decency. All praise to the heroic Vashti for her decent
disobedience." Id. at 166. For a similar position, see also A. KUYPER, WOMEN OF THE OLD
TESTAMENT (H. Zylstra trans. 1961).
Note also the suggestion that Vashti's arrogance had something to do with her royal
lineage, in that she is the grand-daughter of Nebuchadnezzar, "who scoffed at kings and
unto whom princes were a derision." 4 L. GINZBERG, THE LEGENDS OF THE JEWS 375
(1947).
It is clear that the Vashti story is, as the Interpretor's Bible indicates, a requirement
of the plot of the Book of Esther. The story of Esther requires that Vashti leave to make
room for Esther, cousin and adopted daughter of Mordecai. Esther, concealing the fact
that she is a Jew, is chosen by Ahasuerus as his Queen. Esther is later able to defeat the
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but the real point seems to be that "she had a higher idea of
womanly dignity than placing herself on exhibition as one of the
king's possessions. '23
In the tradition of the nineteenth century feminists, Vashti
McCollum 24 wrote of her namesake: "[Vashti] was a spirited wo-
man who refused to exhibit her beauty before the king's drink-
ing companions on the seventh day of a party when 'royal wine
in abundance' had made the king hilarious. It was a man's world
in those days," writes McCollum, "and Vashti was banished for
her successor, Esther. My mother was fond of saying that Vashti
was the first exponent of woman's rights. Perhaps it was for that
reason that I have always liked and been proud of my name. '25
Ultimately, in Vashti's case, we know what she did, but we
do not know why. It is clear that she paid a high price, but just
how high a price is unclear. In one version of the story, Vashti is
not only put aside and banished,2 but in fact killed:
In consequence of all this, Daniel advised, not only that Vashti
should be cast off, but that she should be made harmless for-
ever by the hangman's hand. His advice was endorsed by his
colleagues, and approved by the king. That the king might not
delay the execution of the death sentence, and Daniel himself
thus incur danger to his own life, he made Ahasuerus swear the
most solemn oath known to the Persians, that it would be car-
ried out forthwith."2
Mrs. Stanton wrote: "I have always regretted that the historian
allowed Vashti to drop out of sight so suddenly. Perhaps she was
doomed to some menial service, or to entire sequestration in her
own apartments." The Woman's Bible also suggests that the
king's judgment might have been "modified. . . when his wrath
abated. 28
courtier Haman, who proposes to exterminate the Jews.
23. THE WOMAN'S BIBLE, supra note 17, at 86.
24. Cf. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (mother of the plaintiff
Terry McCollum in the 1948 case on released time).
25. V. MCCOLLUM, ONE WOMAN'S FIGHT 11-12 (1951). She wrote that "in any case, I
have always been eager to set people right when they assumed that I was named after
the once-popular novel of purple passion, Vashti; or, 'Until Death Us Do Part."' Id. at
12.
26. Mrs. Stanton referred to a divorce. THE WOMAN'S BIBLE, supra note 17, at 85.
See also SMITH'S BIBLE DICTIONARY 25 (1979) (referring to Ahasuerus as having divorced
Vashti).
27. 4 L. GINZBERG, supra note 22, at 378.
28. THE WOMAN'S BIBLE, supra note 17, at 87. The text records that the King later
remembered Vashti, but not how or what he did. See M. STERNBERG, THE POETICS OF
DIVORCE STORIES
What would Vashti have said if she had told her own story?
We would assume that, as a human being, she would narrate her
account to serve her own ends. She quite possibly would have
identified herself as a victim. We would also assume-unless we
thought her a straight-out liar-that her account would have
some relation to the actual events, the raw facts of the world.
But the relation of the account to the raw facts would be seen as
an issue to be explored. Vashti's account would be subject to the
observations made by sociologist Ernest Mowrer concerning the
use of personal narratives. "Even a document such as [the
Donaven diary] is incomplete in many respects," he wrote,
"[The diary is] written too much in the spirit of the martyr who
desires sympathy from the reader to contain always a candid ac-
count of the attitudes of the husband."29 Mowrer also notes the
more basic problem: "[W]here the chief interest is in the conflict
between husband and wife, a more complete account is needed
to bring into relief the attitudes of the husband. . .. "30
We would have to think about how we could ever know the
objective reality against which to measure Vashti's version of the
events. 1 We would not take the version of the king, the Jewish
commentators, or the twentieth-century Christian scholar as
that reality. We would not assume these accounts to be truer
than Vashti's own. This is not bias against them or against
Vashti. It is simply systematic skepticism. A certain consonance
between Vashti's version and the king's or minister's version
would have been needed for communication between them, and
we might take as true points on which they agreed. But they
might all be wrong, or the various accounts taken together might
merely be parts of a whole. 32 1f we are fortunate, the parts will
fit; but we could still be mistaken as to the whole, not knowing
BIBLICAL NARRATIVE (1987) (on gaps in biblical texts).
29. E. MOWRER, FAMILY DISORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 260 (1972) (discussing the Diary of Miriam Donaven, see infra). In the case of
Mrs. Chapman we have some indication of what the husband and the Shakers thought.
See Chapman, The Memorial of James Chapman, in THE OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION
22 (1819); The Remonstrance of the Shakers to the Legislature of the State of New
York, in THE OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION 30 (1819).
30. E. MOWRER, supra note 29, at 261.
31. "We live our lives by telling ourselves stories. There is the story, of course: the
story of what happens, which in real life has no teller, at least none that we can hear." R.
GOLDSTEIN, THE LATE SUMMER PASSION OF A WOMAN OF MIND 55 (1989).
32. The narrators would of course have quite different perspectives. For a considera-
tion of the story with an emphasis on Ahasuerus, see M. SAMUEL, CERTAIN PEOPLE OF THE
BOOK (1955).
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just how many parts there are. The various parts might not fit.
Or the principals might simply never have communicated at all.
Vashti might say to the king "wanting me to show myself to the
ministers, you never saw me." To which the king might re-
spond-obliquely-"I married you."
As to Vashti's own story, we would consider whether it was
told in the heat of the events, or recast later; rethought, reexam-
ined, and finally recreated to fit her later sense of herself. "I
thought I was happy with him," Vashti might have written, "but
of course I see now that I was not, and so finally when he told
me to come and show myself, that was the end of it." She, as she
is in her later now, could not have been happy as that earlier
self."3 Her present narrative might tell of her [assumed sup-
pressed] prior anger. The motivations of the later self explain
the acts of the earlier self. We as readers may be more sympa-
thetic with the new Vashti, and less willing to credit the values
of the old Vashti. Alternatively, we may find the new Vashti
brainwashed, a new convert, more royalist than the king, and
the old Vashti authentic-true to her inner voices, her essential
nature, or her social responsibilities.
Yet Vashti's narrative would be important. And it is impor-
tant that we do not have it, since we can see in Vashti the issue
33. Feminist scholarship makes a major claim to build on reinterpretation of experi-
ence through a process called consciousness-raising. Katharine Bartlett writes that this
"[c]onsciousness-raising is an interactive and collaborative process of articulating one's
experiences and making meaning of them with others who also articulate their exper-
iences." Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 863-64 (1990). Bartlett
quotes Leslie Bender: "Feminist consciousness-raising creates knowledge by exploring
common experiences and patterns that emerge from shared tellings of life events. What
were experienced as personal hurts individually suffered reveal themselves as a collective
experience of oppression." Id.
James Elkins suggests that, in the context of marriage counselling, the point is to
move from stories involving self-deception or dishonesty to stories which are (more)
truthful. "The truth of narrative is fundamental to the healing process." Elkins, The
Stories We Tell Ourselves in Law, 40 J. LEGAL. EDUc. 47, 62 (1990). In some processes,
however, the truth to be reached is given-e.g. patriarchy or women's subordina-
tion-and not yet-to-be-found. Further, the truth of how we feel or felt--which is often
what our therapeutic narrative is about-is only part of the relevant truth. The surfacing
of that truth is the beginning, and not the end, of an analytic or evaluative or transform-
ing project.
On multiple selves, and particularly issues arising when early selves try to bind later
selves-the Ulysses and the Siren problem, see J. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1984); Scott, Rational Decision Making
About Marriage and Divorce, 90 VA. L. REV. 9, 58-62 (1990) (in the context of divorce
particularly).
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of the silence of women.34 It is the silence of the often-cited sis-
ter of Shakespeare35 and the hardly remembered sister of Mo-
zart." Vashti's narrative would have been a text for us to work
on, where now we have only the texts of others looking at her
story.3"
The problem arising out of the fact that the women's narra-
tive is missing is just the beginning. We now have women's nar-
ratives that we read and interpret as we do all narratives-with
particular questions and purposes. For some, the questions go to
issues of self-expression or to a fuller sense of the facts. It is
another version of thick description. We need all voices to get a
fuller sense of what is real. Thus, Patricia Williams writes about
her great-great grandmother to reach a hidden story "which had
been overlooked and underseen."'35 Through such "overlooked
stories," women may write to educate men. 9 For others, the em-
phasis is on narratives as a vehicle for self-expression, publicly
or privately. We use narratives as readers, and perhaps as writ-
ers, to locate ourselves, to clarify our own story, to test alterna-
tive realities in our minds, without taking the risks of learning
34. It is worth noting that on one reading, it may be exactly the point that we do
not have Vashti's narrative and that we do not understand Vashti's reasons for refusing
to show herself. Vashti's silence and her refusal to explain may be more a key to Vashti
than the fact of the refusal and certainly more than the contextual aspects of the king
being merry. The point about the refusal may not be that it was based on a "whim," but
that it was based on a secret. And the point of secrets is that they are not told. On this
reading, Vashti stands as one of the great non-communicators, in the line of Cordelia
and Bartleby, and we can never have Vashti's narrative.
35. Judith, the imagined sister of Shakespeare, as described by Virginia Woolf in V.
WOOLF, A RooM oF ONE'S OWN (1929).
36. Maria Anna, the sister of Mozart, though a prodigy as a child "never developed
into anything more." 3 GROVE'S DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND MUSICIANS 570 (1941). See
also Nochlin, Why There Are No Great Women Artists, in WOMEN, ART. AND POWER.
AND OTHER ESSAYS (1988) (on the issue of talent and training); Citron, Fanny Mendels-
sohn Hensel: Musician in Her Brother's Shadow, in THE FEMALE AUTOGRAPH 171, supra
note 3 (on the sister of Mendelssohn).
37. The idea that narratives, even autobiographical narratives, are constructed is
standard in certain fields. See supra note 3 and infra text accompanying notes 166-68. In
other contexts, the idea seems to be that the narrative is to be taken as true.
In certain narrative approaches, the issue of literal truth does not arise. It does not
matter if certain tribes exist. See Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978); Ross, TrIT61, 70
HARV. L. REv. 812 (1957).
38. Williams, On Being an Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988).
39. As J. S. Mill suggested: "[T]he knowledge which men can acquire of women,
even as they have been and are, without reference to what they might be, is wretchedly
imperfect and superficial, and always will be so, until women themselves have told all
that they have to tell." J. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 26 (1988).
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through actual experience.40 "It is the precise role of narrative to
offer us a way of experiencing those effects [consequent on be-
havior] without experimenting with our own lives as well."' 41 But
this emphasis seems to involve as much what we bring to narra-
tive, as what we get from it.
What, after all, does Vashti's story teach us? That if we dis-
obey authority we are put away? Divorced? Banished? Killed?
That if we disobey authority future generations may look at
things differently and think that we were heroic? That, for the
sake of X, Y and Z, we might be justified in doing A or B? 42
That the law ought to be changed? And, if so, how? And to
strengthen which position? These lessons are not intrinsic to
Vashti's story. They are in us, reading it.
Before concluding part II, one final point may be addressed.
The use of Vashti's story conceals a significant problem. We do
not have to defend an interest in the Book of Esther. I take it
that a text which has been read and written about for many cen-
turies may safely be considered worthy of current attention."
We say of such texts that if it was worth their time it is probably
worth ours. Such texts are of interest for themselves-ends not
means. Modern texts-novels, poetry, legal scholarship-often
require some additional justification. As to these narrative
texts-which are not read primarily for information or argu-
ment-sometimes we say that they are art, and as good as any-
thing ever done. But the narrative products of legal scholars do
not usually suggest that they should be held to this standard.
Our interest in them is not defended as primarily artistic. They
are seen as neither data nor art, while being generally both, and
they are seen as especially important in relation to law and legal
institutions. Part III suggests one relationship that might be
possible between law and narrative: a law/society relationship in
40. A reviewer of the Braudy Diary, discussed infra text accompanying note 129,
wrote, "she describes her experiences with a ruthless honesty which forces the reader to
examine her own life." Musmann, Book Review, 100 LIBR. J. 1912 (1975).
41. Hauerwas & Burrel, From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Ration-
ality in Ethics, in WHY NARRATIVE? READINGS IN NARRATIVE THEOLOGY 187 (S. Hauerwas
& L. Jones, eds. 1989). "The verisimilitude of the story, along with its assessable literary
structure, will allow us to ascertain whether we can trust it as a vehicle of insight or
whether we are being misled." Id.
42. Have we enough information about Vashti to reconstruct such a calculation?
Did she have children, for example? Or did she know what she was risking? Kuyper
thought she did. A. KUYPER, supra note 22, at 172.
43. Problems of expanding the canon do not in theory require total rejection of the
existing canon.
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which narratives are used as evidence of societal standards
which are also reflected in law.
III. NARRATIVES AND THE HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
The consideration of Vashti in part II was intended to raise
general issues about the reading of a divorce narrative, in the
context of an ancient text. Part III moves to American divorce
narratives and focuses on what narrative tells us about the ac-
tual reasons for the break-up of a marriage. These reasons relate
to expectations of marriage, expectations also evidenced by the
law of divorce.
The narratives are, of course, different not only in that they
come from different historical periods, but in that they were
produced for different purposes and against different legal back-
grounds. The point here is to consider them as illustrations of
one use of narrative; a use which stresses a consonance between
the law of the state and the actual social sense of the marital
institution. This social sense of marriage is not derived from the
narratives used, but is taken from the work of historians. The
narratives are used to support the historians' work, providing
evidence of a social meaning as well as testimony about an inner
meaning. The comment of Susan Braudy, that her experience is
a common one, is, in short, assumed to be true. Other narratives
that reflect values which are not parallel to those of the culture
or the law, and that would represent minority or individual posi-
tions, could have been chosen.44 That is, in a period which fo-
cused generally on low expectation marriages, stories might exist
which described high expectation marriages, and in a period
which viewed marriage in terms of personal satisfaction, narra-
tives might exist which focused on duty and social meanings
and/or which stressed that personal satisfaction was not an inde-
pendently achievable goal but a by-product of other behavior.
Initially, part III provides an overview of the law of mar-
riage and divorce together with the present understanding of
substantive changes in those institutions. In effect, the narra-
tives are used to illustrate conventional understandings. The
narratives are selected and read to support the point-a point
implied, at least in historical and social science approaches to
44. Here one might wonder whether our sense of the central and marginal stories
was correct.
143]
156 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1991
the history of divorce-that state divorce law is built on a par-
ticular model of marriage.45
A. Marriage
Marriage, even in monogamous societies, clearly is not one
thing. It is therefore initially an error to conceive of the history
of divorce as if it concerns changing ways of dissolving the same
institution. As tempting as it is to assume a universal quality in
human emotions and institutions, it is more useful to start with
the critical sense that emotions and institutions are historically
variable to a considerable degree. We are misled in this respect
by the fact that we use the same words to describe certain insti-
tutions, e.g., "marriage." As to ancient Greece, Finley tells us
that "Odysseus was fond of Penelope, beyond a doubt, and he
found her sexually desirable. She was part of what he meant by
'home'. '46 Monogamy was the rule, Finley writes, but this form
of monogamy did not "impose monogamous sexuality on the
male nor did it place the small family at the centre of a man's
emotional life."4 7 Indeed, Finley notes, "the language had no
word for the small family, in the sense in which one might say, 'I
want to go back to live with my family.' "48
We have reached quite a different point. Historians and an-
thropologists49 have attempted to convey both the range of mari-
tal institutions and, particularly important for present purposes,
the growth of the affective aspects of the institution we pres-
ently call marriage.5 0 It is now conventional to link the demands
of that particular institution to free legal divorce and the in-
creased social acceptance of divorce. The view that, in effect, di-
vorce makes modern family life possible has many echoes.5
45. Llewellyn had said as much. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce 1, 32 COLUM.
L. REV. 1281, at 1281 (1932).
46. M. FINLEY, THE WORLD OF ODYSSEUS 137 (1954).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., R. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 210 (1959) (describing an Eskimo
marriage in which the murderer of a husband, under principles of restitution, takes the
place of the husband).
50. L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX, AND MARRIAGE (1977).
51. See W. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1967). Degler notes that
O'Neill's view relates to families. "Yet from what we know about divorces in the late
19th century, most of them dissolved marriages, not families. About 60% of all divorces
between 1847 and 1906, for example, did not involve children." C. DEGLER, AT ODDS:
WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 168 (1980)
(emphasis in original & citation omitted).
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The contrast here is between an earlier and a later view of
marriage as it relates to obligation. Bishop's definition of mar-
riage suggests the traditional nineteenth-century focus on duties
and the community. 52 This definition may be expanded to in-
clude personal fulfillment as suggested in our' time.53 Historian
Elaine May writes that in the earlier understanding:
[M]arriage was part of an effort to establish a tranquil domes-
tic environment. Violations of familial ethics which culminated
in divorce were an affront to the community as well as the ag-
grieved spouse. Husbands and wives neither expected nor
hoped that their spouse would provide them with ultimate ful-
fillment in life, or that the home would be a self-contained pri-
vate domain geared toward the personal happiness of individ-
ual family members.5 4
It was this limited-expectation form of marriage which changed
over time:
By 1920, we find that the ideal of marriage had evolved some-
what ambiguously. Matrimony was intended to promote the
happiness of the spouses. A certain amount of fun and amuse-
ment was expected as part of the bargain. At the same time,
children were anticipated and the familial responsibilities of
both husbands and wives remained virtually unchallenged. 55
This meant that wives "wanted their mates to be good providers
as well as funloving pals; men desired wives who were exciting as
well as virtuous. s5 The idea was that "marriage would include
fewer sacrifices and more satisfactions. When combined with
persistent Victorian holdovers, new expectations could lead to
new tensions. '57
Sociologists provide additional descriptions of present ex-
pectations. They offer insight into the content of what is ordina-
52. "Marriage. . . is a civil status of one man and one woman united in law for life,
for the discharge, to each other and the community, of the duties legally incumbent on
those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex." 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 2 (1881).
53. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831
(1976) ("The joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially
productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a
life time.").
54. E. MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE & DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA
47 (1980).
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rily called "companionate marriage"" which goes beyond the
typical suggestion that it historically relates to some sort of idea
of equality and companionship. Peter and Brigitte Berger write:
Bourgeois marriage is designed to provide a "haven" of stable
identity and meaning in a social situation where these are very
scarce commodities. Here there is the norm of mutual concern
for all aspects of the individual's life. Further, it is here that
two individuals are in a position to construct a "world of their
own," again something that is not easy to do elsewhere amid
the complexities of modern life.
59
The Bergers quote an earlier version of this idea, stressing mar-
riage as a source of meaning:
It is here that the individual will seek power, intelligibility,
and, quite literally a name-the apparent power to fashion a
world, however Lilliputian, that will reflect his own being....
[A] world in which, consequently, he is somebody. This idea
has immense consequences. It is not an aspiration that one
gives up easily. And thus those who have found it unrealizable
in one marriage, in large numbers try again-and if necessary,
again once more."
Like others, the Bergers see the high divorce rate as the
idealization of marriage:
In this sense, we would contend, the high divorce rates indicate
the opposite of what conventional wisdom holds: People di-
vorce in such numbers not because they are turned off by mar-
riage but, rather, because their expectations of marriage are so
high that they will not settle for, unsatisfactory approxima-
tions. In other words, divorce is mainly a backhanded compli-
ment to the ideal of modern marriage, as well as a testimony to
its difficulties."'
The Bergers conclude that "[b]ourgeois marriage, among those
who continue to live within its normative boundaries, continues
to provide the stable identity and meaning it was originally
designed to provide. '6 2
Brigitte Bodenheimer, writing from the perspective of a
58. See B. LINDSAY & W. EVANS, THE COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE (1927).




62. Id. at 167. See also C. RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK 21-74 (1990).
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family law teacher and scholar, offers this description of
marriage:
The meaning of marriage has undergone profound changes
within the last few generations, as has been pointed out by
many writers. Husband and wife, often uprooted from their
home communities, are facing each other in isolation as never
before. The wife's subordination has ended. True, equal part-
nership is the goal, with a highly personal bond, a commitment
in depth and complexity, between the spouses. This refined
and lofty ideal imposes much higher demands and therefore
carries in itself the seeds of more failures than the older, more
down-to-earth idea of matrimony. 3
The idea of the companionate marriage had to do with the
idea that marriages (assumed now to be built on ideas of family
planning) ought to be focused on companionship. As Nancy Cott
formulates, family life was "a specialized site for emotional inti-
macy, personal and sexual expression and nurture among hus-
band, wife and a small number of children. 6 4 The idea of com-
panionate marriage modified a traditional position of feminism.
Where feminism had once attacked bourgeois marriage, the
"sexual pattern advanced in social science (and popular culture)
of the 1920's confirmed bourgeois marriage as women's destina-
tion."'65 An emphasis on psychological needs and increased psy-
chological sophistication meant that the demands for intimacy
became greater and greater.6 Marriage was the basis of the fam-
ily and marriage created a new nomos. This nomos, at least in
theory, made a claim of exclusiveness so total that all non-mari-
63. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAhl. L.
179, 189-90 (1968) (citations omitted).
64. N. COrr, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 156 (1987).
65. Id.
66. At least in some parts of the culture. Mirra Komarovsky referred to "the mea-
gerness of verbal communication that characterizes [blue collar] marriages" and also
"the absence of certain norms," particularly the confidante/best friend norm:
In interpreting specific cases, such norms were judged very weak or non-exis-
tent, not only because they were not voiced, but because emotionally signifi-
cant experiences were regularly shared with others in preference to one's mate
without any perceptible feeling that this reflected upon the quality of the mar-
riage. Moreover, some persons acknowledged their ignorance of the thoughts
and feelings of the mate without the apology or defensiveness usually accompa-
nying violations of norms.
M. KoMAROVSKY, BLUE COLLAR MARRIAGE 125 (1967).
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tal intimacy of any quality could be seen as in derogation of
marriage.81
In effect, what we have seen is the triumph of the liberals in
the nineteenth-century debate over marriage and divorce.
"Nothing so divided liberals and conservatives as the relation-
ship of happiness to [the divorce question]. . . ." As the tradi-
tional functions of marriage and the family have been increas-
ingly taken over by other institutions,19 the emphasis on
marriage and the family as vehicle for happiness has increased.
O'Neill noted: "[C]onservatives invariably felt that happiness, if
it came at all, was a bonus which no one had a right to ex-
pect. . . .Nothing was more revolutionary about the liberals'
defense of divorce than their insistence that happiness was a
necessary condition of marriage. '1 70
Marriage is an issue for men and women, though there is a
dimension to it which relates particularly to changes in the sta-
tus of women. Companionate marriage, as it was understood un-
til very recently, coexisted with extreme gender role division and
a general context of male dominance. 1 Options became available
in the twentieth century, however, which were largely unavaila-
ble earlier. In nineteenth-century America, marriage for women
was effectively an economic necessity. On this issue, Susan B.
Anthony saw the change in her lifetime: "Woman is no longer
compelled to marry for support, but may herself make her own
home and earn her own financial independence. '72 But, as
Nancy Cott has noted, while there is less reason to marry for
economic reasons, "the model of companionate marriage with its
emphasis on female heterosexual desires made marriage a sexual
necessity, for 'normal satisfaction.' ",73 The word "normal" here
67. Berger & Kellner, Marriage and the Construction of Reality, 46 DIOGENES 1
(1964). Berger & Kellner discuss marriage as a reality-creating institution which tends to
eliminate competitive orderings and accounts in part through the "dominance of the
marital discourse." Id. at 12. See also C. RIESSMAN, supra note 62, at 51 (on the intimacy
requirements of marriage).
68. W. O'NEILL, supra note 51, at 220.
69. But not, of course, entirely. See Teitelbaum, Families in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 801 (1989).
70. Id.
71. For a recent examination of modern divorce stories, see C. RIESSMAN, supra note
62.
72. Anthony, The Status of Woman, Past, Present, and Future, 17 ARENA BOSTON,
902-04 (1897).
73. N. COTT, supra note 64, at 158. See also, Densmore, On Celibacy, 1 J. FEMALE
LIBERATION 22 (1965) (noting the enormous emphasis being placed on sexuality as a
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suggests an entire sanctioning system outside the legal system;
one based on norms of health and well-being, and one which
took as its basic position an opposition to difference.
The history of women following legal emancipation is in a
way incomprehensible-why did so few women go to school,
enter professions, or seek lives outside the home-without the
understanding that conformity, or at least avoidance of excessive
deviance, rather than conformity to any particular ideal, is the
goal of most of the people most of the time."' The normal may
itself create problems. Thus, the ideal of normal sexuality con-
ceals a fair number of questions about the meaning of sexuality
for women, and particularly the use of sexuality as a substitute,
as Susan Sontag wrote, "for genuine freedom and for so many
other pleasures (intimacy, intensity, feeling of belonging, blas-
phemy) which this society frustrates. '75 But whatever the diffi-
culties with the ideas of normal sex and normal marriage in
American culture, these ideas were in fact the norm. Marriage
was a significant way by which to express one's integration into
the larger social community, and make public the fact that one
had met the demands of that community, enforced by the legal
system, by the social system, and by the immediate demands of
one's own family.
B. Divorce
The history of divorce involves various strands, of which
two are commonly discussed. The first is the free divorce of the
Roman Empire in which it was possible for men and women to
marry and divorce many times. The second is the highly restric-
tive divorce of Christianity which conceived of marriage as not
roadblock on the way to liberation) (quoted in J. BERNARD, supra note 4, at 222-23). The
"supposed need" for sex had therefore to be "refuted, coped with, demythified, or the
cause of female liberation is doomed." Id. Usually "what passes for sexual need is actu-
ally desire to be stroked; desire for recognition or love; desire to conquer, humiliate, or
wield power; or desire to communicate." Id. See also O'Neill's reference to the classic
feminist demand "for more work and less sex." W. O'NEILL, supra note 51, at 127. Ethel
Persons has pointed out that it is far from clear what role genital sexuality has in the
formation of female identity-perhaps much less than in the formation of male identity.
Persons, Sexuality as a Mainstay of Identity, 5 SIGNS 605, 618-21 (1980).
74. Presumably the goal of men as well as women. Edward Sapir referred to the
"useful tyranny of the normal." SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD SAPIR 514 (D. Mandel-
baum ed. 1949).
75. Sontag, The Third World of Women, 1973 PARTISAN REV. 180, 189. Sontag omits
from this list some other possibilities. See Densmore, supra, note 73.
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only for lifq, but indeed beyond,76 in that some theologians re-
jected the idea that one could remarry after the death of a
spouse.
While the conflict between these approaches went on for
some time, the Anglo-American tradition formally derives from
the second. For example, there was no divorce except legislative
divorce in England for some time,77 and the American colonies
began with a fairly restrictive approach to divorce derived from
the Protestant adaptation of the Catholic position. By the early
nineteenth century, legislative divorce in the United States be-
gan to yield to the institution of judicial divorce.
As Roscoe Pound indicates in his discussion of Justice Ac-
cording to Law,78 legislative divorce is an aspect of legislative
justice, and, along with other illustrations of this process, it "all
but came to an end" in the nineteenth century. It should be
noted, however, that while the constitutionality of legislative di-
vorce was debated, a divorce granted by a territorial legislature
was upheld by the Supreme Court as late as 1887."'
Divorce was granted only for specific reasons. Expansion of
these grounds was one basis for the controversies over divorce in
the nineteenth century. The development of divorce law became
76. R. PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY
(1988).
77. See Mueller, Inquiry into the State of a Divorceless Society, 18 U. PITT. L. REV.
545 (1957). "The title of this paper is misleading, for England was not entirely divorce-
less during the period of inquiry. [Divorce by act of the legislature had become available
for the cause of adultery.] After a parliamentary divorce the innocent party was at lib-
erty to remarry. Very rarely a parliamentary divorce was granted for cruelty." Id.
78. 2 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 77, at 392 (1959).
79. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), often quoted for its general language on
the importance of marriage. Legislative divorces ended in England in 1857, and "in the
United States were precluded by constitutional provisions or became obsolete by the last
quarter of the century." R. POUND, supra note 78.
Yet in 1914, Simeon Baldwin could still attack legislative divorce in strong terms:
"The whole drift of modern institutions is away from unconfined legislative power. The
grant of legislative divorce is one of the extremist forms which it can assume. It does not
belong to the social life of the twentieth century." Baldwin, Legislative Divorces and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 27 HARV. L. REV. 699, 704 (1914). Baldwin notes that before the
fourteenth amendment, it was widely assumed that "state legislatures could grant di-
vorces a vinculo when the constitution of their state did not forbid, at least for causes for
which they could not be granted by the courts." Id. at 699. He explains that while Brit-
ish parliamentary divorces had been limited to adultery, "such a limitation was in its
nature purely a matter of legislative discretion." Id. Baldwin notes that attempts to have
the legislature grant legislative divorces in Connecticut were made as late as 1913. Id. at
703. He suggests that in earlier legislative divorces, while the causes of divorce were
rarely stated in the final Act, the actual cause in a majority of the cases was probably
insanity existing before the marriage. Id. at 701.
DIVORCE STORIES
a notable illustration of the difference between the law on the
books and the law in action. Roscoe Pound wrote:
What would the average community do to a [man] convicted
judicially of extreme cruelty to a [woman]? Yet there are com-
ing to be respected persons of high standing in all communities
against whom there are such records. We know that in many
parts of the country, at least extreme cruelty has become a
convenient fiction to cover up that incompatibility of temper
that may not unreasonably exist between a respected [man and
his wife]. The . . . judge-made rule against collusion remains
in the books. But husband and wife agree upon a settlement of
property out of court, they agree that she shall aver and prove
cruelty unopposed. . . . [In those communities], public
thought and feeling have changed, and whatever the law in the
books, the law'in action is changing with them.80
This, then, is the late fault period, a period in which collusive
divorce in the old categories becomes consensual divorce in the
new ones. To the extent that modern no-fault divorce is read as
having merely eliminated the fiction of the late fault divorce, it
may also be read as doing little new. But it did more in fact than
simply facilitate consensual divorces; it moved essentially to a
system of unilateral divorce.8'
Friedman and Percival have summarized the history of
divorce:
In the first stage, divorce is difficult and rare. Only a few
grounds are available. There is social pressure against divorce,
and divorce bears a heavy stigma. Women are generally sub-
servient to men. Middle-class women on the whole rarely take
part in the work force. A divorced woman has an awkward role
in society. Divorce is confined, as a practical matter, to a few
people, mostly upper class. As far as we can tell, the grounds
alleged in court are grounded in reality. That is, if adultery is
the complaint, the defendant really was an adulterer or adul-
teress, and adultery was either the cause or at least the excuse
for the plaintiff's case.82
They describe the increased expectations of marriage and the
democratization of divorce.
80. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 21 (1910).
81. See Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
79.
82. Friedman & Percival, Who Sues For Divorce? From Fault Through Fiction to
Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 76 (1976).
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As William L. O'Neill has pointed out, people expected more
out of marriage than in traditional eras; a wife was to be more
than sex partner, servant, and nursemaid; a husband was to be
more than a breadwinner and protector. Marriage was sup-
posed to be a partnership of love. This was presumably a mi-
nority view, which slowly percolated downward and outward in
society. As it spread, divorce was no longer restricted to the
upper class. Divorce was democratized .
3
Friedman and Percival also add a new dimension focusing
on legitimization of status:
New demands on marriage increased the demand for easier di-
vorce. But changing expectations cannot alone account for
loose divorce laws. No doubt Italy too felt the pull of modern
marriage, at least to a degree; but divorce remained stubbornly
outlawed. What was strongly felt in the United States was a
demand for legitimization of status. . . . In the first place, di-
vorce was probably less stigmatic than sex outside of marriage.
Men and women who had left their old partners wanted to
form new families, have children, live normal economic and so-
cial lives. They saw no reason why the law should not let them
do so, legitimately. 4
C. Narratives and Divorce Law
Our information about early American divorce is often
based on divorce records themselves.8 " As Nancy Cott suggests,
the "history of divorce practice documents sex-role expectations
[and] permits comparison between the obligation and freedom
of husbands and wives. . . ."I" Lawrence Friedman tells us
about southern legislatures which "granted divorces by passing
private statutes, dissolving the marriages of specific persons.
The statute books contain hundreds of these private divorces.
They are usually short, stereotyped, and tell little or nothing
about what led to the divorce. '8 7 He cites, as an example, an
1839 Virginia law8 declaring that the marriage between Mary
Cloud and William Cloud "is hereby dissolved, the said Mary
83. Id. at 78.
84. Id.
85. See Cott, Divorce and Changing Status of Women in 18th Century Massachu-
setts, 33 WM. & MARY QUARTERLY 586 (1976).
86. Id.
87. Friedman, Rights of Passage, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 652 (1984).
88. 1839 Laws Va., ch. 262 (cited in id. at 652 n.10).
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forever divorced from her husband. . and the power and au-
thority of the said William over the person and property of the
said Mary, shall henceforth cease and determine."89
1. Nineteenth Century Divorce Narratives
a. Legislative divorce in the early nineteenth century. Not-
withstanding the stereotypical nature of legislative divorces, per-
haps we can use a narrative of the legislative divorce in a partic-
ularly extreme case to project an image of nineteenth-century
marriage. The narrative relates to the controversy between a
married woman and her husband, against the background of the
early nineteenth-century Shaker communities.9 The narrative
illustrates the grounds thought appropriate for a legislative di-
vorce and permits the inference that the law believes marriage
could be dissolved only for factually grave cause. The grounds
presented to the system in the petition for divorce are in fact
the reasons as presented in the narratives.9
The author of the narrative is Eunice Chapman, the daugh-
ter of a man from Bridgeport, Connecticut. Eunice Chapman
married James Chapman, a merchant from New Durham, New
York and they had three children. She wrote in her statement of
the case that
[f]rom the year 1804 until about the year 1809, I lived with
him in the most cordial harmony, stupid and insensible to his
faults-vigilant to make his life comfortable and happy, when
he, about this time, had several interviews with the Shaking
Quakers, after which he gave himself up to a continual intoxi-
cation and vice. When in his sober hours, I, with eyes dis-
solved in tears, entreated of him for the sake of the dear
89. Friedman, supra note 87.
90. See N. BLAKE, ROAD TO RENO (1962) (discussing the Chapman case); Blake, Eu-
nice Against the Shakers, 61 N. Y. HiST. 359 (1960).
91. These are of course narratives for public consumption, raising even more clearly
than private diaries the issue of construction of a story for a particular purpose. If we
want to say that the story is in fact a lie, we must consider the possibilities that the lie is
thought to be functional, perhaps because it will be believed, or perhaps because it will
be disbelieved (X transparently lies to protect Y; so that everyone will believe that Y
really is so awful that his" character needs protection while X is established as good).
Regarding the divorce novel as narrative see J. BARNETT, DIVORCE AND THE AMERICAN
DIVORCE NOVEL, 1858-1937 (1968) (note the limits of this work, which considers only
novels in which a divorce takes place, not those in which divorce is argued against, e.g.,
A. EVANS, VASHTI; OR, "UNTIL DEATH Us Do PART" (1869)). For those novels in which the
possibility of free divorce is the background of the narrative, see, e.g., E. WHARTON, THE
GLIMPSES OF THE MOON (1922) (assuming the free-divorce contract can be acted upon).
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pledges of our mutual love, to refrain from dissipation, lest it
would result in the misery of his family. With a conscience
awakened to horror and despair, he would hurry to the haunts
of vice to get a draught to drown his senses and to stifle his
conscience. He would frequently return home at a late hour of
the night with such a very menacing countenance and con-
duct, that I often felt in imminent danger of my life.9 2
In 1811, Chapman left his wife, leaving her with no furniture
(according to her account) except her bed, and generally failing
to provide for her maintenance.9 3 James Chapman joined the
Shakers in 1812.9" Passing over the events of the intervening pe-
riod, we are told that Chapman finally indicated to his wife that
the Shakers had a house for her and the children. In 1814, she
went to the Shaker village to see the house but found none.
When she returned home, her children were gone. 5
The rest of the story is an account of Mrs. Chapman's ef-
forts to persuade the New York legislature to give her a divorce.
Her grievances ranged from desertion, neglect, non-support, and
drunkenness, to cruelty and adultery. In 1818, the legislature
gave Eunice Chapman a divorce, 96 and, in 1819, she received a
court order giving her custody of the children.
92. Chapman, An Account of the Conduct of the Shakers, in the Case of Eunice
Chapman & Her Children, in THE OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION (1818).
93. See BLAKE, supra note 90, at 360 (citing Eunice Chapman).
94. His own version stresses that "in order to find my union with these people, I
must first fulfil every lawful contract that I had ever made. . . and especially the mar-
riage contract." Chapman, supra, note 29, at 25. He then said he considered it right that
he should "make one more effort to live with her in peace, and to give her a fair offer of
removing with myself and children, to live near these people. ... Id.
95. Blake, supra note 90. See also M. DYER, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE
SERPENT FROM THE GARDEN OF EDEN TO THE PRESENT DA" 119-25 (1847) (extracts from
Mrs. Chapman's narrative).
96. The legislature's version of the story stresses the aspects of desertion and non-
support:
AN ACT FOR THE RELIEF OF EUNICE CHAPMAN, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES, PASSED ON MARCH 14, 1818
Whereas Eunice Chapman, in the year one thousand eight hundred and four,
was lawfully married to James Chapman, by whom she had three children,
and with whom she lived until the year one thousand eight hundred and
eleven, when the said James Chapman abandoned his said wife, without leav-
ing her any means of support, and soon after joined the society of Shakers in
Niskeyuna, in the county of Albany: And whereas, the said James Chapman,
since joining the society of Shakers, has taken from his wife her children, and
now keeps them concealed from her, and insists that the marriage contract
between him and his said wife is annulled, and that he is not bound to sup-
port her, and has publicly forbid all persons from harboring her, and declared
that he would not be responsible for her debts: Therefore,
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The tone of Mrs. Chapman's narrative 97 is clear from the
following extract, focused not on the divorce itself, but on the
problem of retrieving the children from the Shaker community
after the divorce. She is a heroine more than a victim.
After the [divorce] bill had become a law, and I could
protect and defend myself, I resolved to go in pursuit of my
children. In a remarkable manner I was informed where they
were carried when taken from Niskeyuna. I first sent my
books to Enfield, and then dismissed my school. On the 9th of
May, 1819, I entered the stage, in a dismal thunder storm,
under a fictitious name, to avoid being traced by the Shakers.
After a perilous journey, caused by the state of the roads at
that season, I arrived at Brattleboro, 76 miles from Albany, at
2 o'clock in the morning, having been 24 hours in coming that
distance. On the 10th, there fell torrents of rain, and with a
crowded stage, which coming near upsetting, I fainted
through fear. At evening, I arrived in Hanover. On the 13th, I
took the stage to Enfield, and stepped at the stage house, two
miles beyond the Shaker Village.
I complained of being unwell, and much fatigued, and un-
able to travel; thus made an excuse to stop a few days to rest.
I soon found I had landed in one of the best of families, who,
suspecting my business, privately sent for Mary Dyer,98 who
hastened to my apartment, and introduced herself by ex-
claiming, "Mrs. Chapman, can this be you?" We met like two
unfortunate sisters.9
Mrs. Chapman's narrative suggests that an individual's
complaint,100 if given sufficient time, could result in the solution
of the particular problem. Blake writes that the New York legis-
lature devoted more of its time and energy to a single private
divorce bill than it ever did to any general marriage law proposal
Be it enacted by the People of the State of New York, represented in Senate
and Assembly, That the marriage contract between the said Eunice Chapman
and her said husband, James Chapman, be, and the same is hereby declared to
be dissolved, and the said Eunice Chapman entirely freed from the same: Pro-
vided, That the dissolution of such marriage shall, in no wise, effect the legiti-
macy of the children thereof. ...
M. DYER, supra note 95, at 118-19.
97. Blake notes the heavy gothic atmosphere. Blake, supra note 90, at 374. In 1818
Eunice Chapman described herself as a widow, a woman bereaved of her husband and
children while still living. Id.
98. On Mary Dyer's difficulties with the Shakers, see M. DYER, supra note 95, at
223-25.
99. Id. at 119-20.
100. The Dyer/Chapman narratives are in the form of complaint.
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referring to the period 1815-1818, when the legislative divorce in
the Chapman case was finally granted.101 The particular solution
also could enter the statutes as a formal grounds for divorce.
10 2
The entire story suggests that an element considered to justify
the disolution was the intensity of the difficulty with the mar-
riage. Divorce with full rights to remarry for both parties was
not the only legal solution in such cases. Both the legislatures
and the individuals involved might well have considered separa-
tion as an alternative. A narrative quoted by Nancy Cott sounds
the theme of separation: "I persuaded myself, that if he would
do what was right, relative to our property, and would go to
some distant place, where we should be afflicted with him no
more, it might be sufficient.' 0 3 Separation was seen as an appro-
priate remedy in a case involving incest and adultery. The stan-
dards involved-that the presence of the husband afflicted the
wife and children-can be read as the general standard for di-
vorce in low expectation marriages.
b. A narrative of late nineteenth century feminism. Eliza-
beth Cady Stanton's interest in the problem of divorce is well
known. She addressed the question for many years, and her last
published article before her death dealt with the issue. We can
begin the discussion with a story told by Mrs. Stanton concern-
ing a victim of an unhappy marriage:
101. N. BLAKE, supra note 90, at 68-69. At one stage in the proceeding, New York's
Council of revision rejected the divorce finding that separation would provide an ade-
quate remedy and that the anti-Shaker provisions of the bill were objectionable. Id.
102. See discussion of divorce legislation in several states in C. WEISBROD, THE
BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA 46 (1980).
103. Bailey Memoirs cited by Cott, supra note 85. Cott reports that Mrs. Bailey did
ultimately obtain a divorce. Separation was once one of the legal solutions available. See
also Hartog, Abigail Bailey's Coverture: Law in a Married Woman's Consciousness (un-
published paper 1990). Elizabeth Scott raises the possibility again, in instances in which
the parents remain married but live apart. Scott, supra note 33, at n.206. The conse-
quences of separation in the 19th century were seen, by Annie Besant at least, to be
quite destructive:
A technical tie is kept up, which retains on the wife the mass of disabilities
which flow from marriage, while depriving her of all the privileges, and which
widows both man and women, exiling them from home life and debarring them
from love. . . . [T]he semi-divorced wife . . . is compelled to live on, without
the freedom of the spinster or the widow, or the social consideration of the
married woman.
A. BESANT, MARRIAGE As IT WAS. As IT IS, AND As IT SHOULD BE 40 (1879). A fictional
Vashti chose separation. A. EVANS, supra note 91. See also M. KELLEY, PRIVATE WOMAN,
PUBLIC STAGE 237 (1984) (quoting novel as calling divorce "sacrilegious trifling.") For
Mrs. Stanton on separation, see Address by Elizabeth Stanton to the Judiciary Commit-
tee of the New York Senate (Feb. 8, 1861) (on the New York Divorce Bill).
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Traveling, not long since, I noticed in the seat near me a
sweet, girlish looking woman, dressed in deep black. She
looked so sad and lonely that I went to her and proposed a
walk on the platform while the cars were stopping. We were
soon friends, and she gave me her sorrowful experiences. Mar-
ried at sixteen to a young man of wealth, education and good
family, but of intemperate habits, which she thought his affec-
tion for her would enable her to control; the mother of three
sons before she was twenty, all sickly, nervous, restless; her
own health broken down with anxiety, and watching not only
the children, night after night, but the father; friends, think-
ing it best to get him out of New York from the many tempta-
tions of a city, with active business in the country, sent him to
the oil regions in Pennsylvania, and there this delicate, pure,
refined young child spent six years of her life trying to win a
besotted man to the paths of virtue and peace. Night after
night, when the babies were asleep, she would go alone
through sleet, and rain, and snow, all round one of those
rough pioneer settlements, into every den of vice, looking for
the father of her chilrden [sic] that she might get him home.
"One thing," said she, "he would always do-lay down his
cards and glass and follow me, but on our way home he would
say: 'Mary, such places are not fit for you.' 'Then,' I replied,
'a man who frequents such places is not a fit companion for
me.' But these," said she "were six long years of useless strug-
gle. He became cross and irritable, loathsome, bloated, dis-
gusting, turned my love to hate, and after a fearful attack of
delirium tremens, the grave covered my shame and misfor-
tunes, and my three children lie by his side. And when, with
aching heart, I buried them all there, you may wonder to hear
me say so, but it was with a sorrowful thankfulness, for I
remembered that warning in the second commandment, given
mid the thunders of Sinai: 'The sins of the fathers shall be
visited upon the children.' Now, said I, I shall be saved the
unspeakable sorrow of ever seeing my own sons come reeling
home to me with that silly, sensual leer that is worse than
abuse and profanity." What a chapter of experience for a girl
not twenty-five! And multitudes are following in her wake!!1 0
104. A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 63-64 (P. Davis ed.
1871). Mrs. Stanton sometimes invoked a highly romantic view of marriage; at other
times, her view seems more functional. See infra. See also the discussion of the drunkard
and marriage in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 482 (E. Stanton, S. Anthony, & M. Gage
eds. 1887).
On Mrs. Stanton and marriage and divorce, see particularly Clark, Self-ownership
and the Political Theory of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 21 CONN. L. REV. 905 (1989); Clark,
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Stanton concluded that liberal divorce laws were necessary
to save women from the slavery of marriage. The precise shape
of the divorce laws proposed by Stanton varied, sometimes fo-
cusing on expansion of the fault grounds, and sometimes focus-
ing on free divorce parallel to free marriage. In 1884, she argued
(perhaps strategically) that we were still in an "experimental
stage" with reference to divorce, and that it was too soon to for-
mulate a national law.105 But the victim of an unhappy marriage
was equally a victim of a system in which women were not edu-
cated for their self-support. 06 Better divorce laws-though a
significant focus of Stanton's activities-were logically only one
part of the solution.
Stanton's narrative is in the tradition of horror stories
supra note 5. Mrs. Stanton may have seen romantic love in marriage as a solution. She
also, however, invoked an image of intellectual women, from the remote past. Here is her
description of the hetairae:
Among the Greeks there was a class of women that possessed absolute free-
dom, surrounded by the wisest men of their day. They devoted themselves to
study and thought, which enabled them to add to their other charms an in-
tense intellectual fascination, and to make themselves the center of a literary
society of matchless splendor .... In the society of this remarkable type of
Grecian womanhood the most brilliant artists, poets, historians, and philoso-
phers found their highest inspiration.
Stanton, Has Christianity Benefited Woman?, 140 N. AM. REV. 389, 393-94 (1885). Mrs.
Stanton knew that "the position of these women was questionable" but was still able to
raise the question: "Does the same class in Christian civilization enjoy as high culture
and equal governmental protection?" Id. On the hetairae see W. SANGER, HISTORY OF
PROSTITUTION 53-63 (1921); E. CANTERELLA, PANDORA'S DAUGHTERS 49-50 (1987). Demos-
thenes said that Athenian men had three women, the wife for legitimate children; concu-
bines for care of the body and the hetaera for pleasure. Id. at 48. If we say that all three
are now in one, "the wife," we might also say that it is possible to classify marriages in
terms of whether, and when, the mother or the servant/concubine or consort/companion
role, dominates the constellation of female roles in the marriage.
105. Stanton, Are Homogenous Divorce Laws in all The States Desirable, 138 N.
Am. REV. 405 (1884). See also Divorce vs Domestic Warfare, 1 ARENA 560 (1890) (ad-
vancing individual sovereignty in divorce as in marriage). This is of course a familiar
argument for federalism generally. Mrs. Stanton was responding to proposals which
would have restricted divorce on the national level.
106. This theme continues to be a major one in feminist writing:
Unless they work, and their work is usually as valuable as their husbands',
married women have not even the chance of gaining real power over their own
lives which means the power to change their lives. The arts of psychological
coercion and reconciliation for which women are notorious-flattery, charm,
wheedling, glamor, tears-are a servile substitute for real influence and real
autonomy.
Sontag, supra note 75, at 187. She later notes that "[fior a woman to leave home to go
out into 'the world' and work rarely carries a full commitment to 'the world,' that is,
achievement . Id. at 192.
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designed to move political audiences. 10 7 Apparently it did.108 But
the moral of the story, and its normative message, is not neces-
sarily free divorce. Rather, at the time, the point might have
been that women should not have to stay married to drunk-
ards.109 An expansion of the fault grounds provides an adequate
remedy. The theory is that, in effect, divorce is permissible, even
important, for particular reasons.110
What is the relationship between these ideas and Stanton's
own marriage? The Stantons, we are told, had an unusual mar-
riage. Griffiths says that Henry Stanton was absent as much as
ten months a year for twenty years, and that when he died in
1887 the couple "were apparently at odds and had not lived in
the same place for twenty years." ' We also know that she was
never divorced and apparently never tried to be.
Griffiths tells us that "she built her argument against 'man-
made marriage' between 1840 and 1863, the first half of her own
forty-seven year marriage, and used as evidence 'from my own
life, observation, thought, feeling and reason.'""
Perhaps Stanton's own description of her marriage can help
us get the life and the ideas into relation.1 3' Thus, Stanton
writes that her own wedding day was delayed:
107. For a contemporary use of horror stories, see Fineman, Implementary Equal-
ity: Idealology, Contradiction and Social Change; A Study of Rhetoric and Results in
the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wisc. L. REV. 789.
108. E. DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 148 (1978) (woman who divorced after
hearing Mrs. Stanton speak on divorce).
109. Historians can respond to this issue in a particular individual's case. On Stan-
ton, see Clark, supra note 5. The narrative itself supports both broad and narrow norma-
tive implications. Clark notes that Stanton and Anthony had both urged that "wives of
chronic inebrieties had a 'duty to seek a separation, to sever conjugal relationship, so as
not to be the agent of breeding a drunkard's child.'" Id. at 26. Clark also notes that in
general, early feminists invoked ideas of duty rather than right in dealing with the di-
vorce issue. Id. at 28.
110. Other Stanton ideas go further, focusing on free divorce and self sovereignty.
111. Griffith, Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Marriage and Divorce: Feminist Theory
and Domestic Experience, in WOMAN'S BEING WOMAN'S PLACE: FEMALE IDENTITY AND VO-
CATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 236 (M. Kelley ed. 1979).
112. Id. at 233.
113. See Minow, Rights of One's Own (Book Review), 98 HARv. L. REV. 1084, 1088
n.15 (1985) (reviewing E. GRIFFITH, IN HER OWN RIGHI' THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY
STANTON (1984)).
Griffith offers no comment on whether Stanton's passion for divorce reform
reflected in any way her own marital experience. Such a connection is not im-
plausible, given the course of Stanton's marriage: she and her husband had
frequent personal and political disagreements, and maintained separate resi-
dences for many years. Her husband slipped from prominence in the abolition
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This delay compelled us to be married on Friday, which is
commonly supposed to be a most unlucky day. But as we lived
together, without more than the usual matrimonial friction, for
nearly a half a century, had seven children, all but one of
whom are still living, and have been well sheltered, clothed,
and fed, enjoying sound minds in sound bodies, no one need be
afraid of going through the marriage ceremony on Friday for
fear of bad luck." 4
Among the possible reasons for her failure to divorce are
loyalty to her spouse (as father of her children), fear of injury to
herself or her children if she did divorce, and no need to divorce,
nor desire to re-marry. Apparently, economic reasons were not a
consideration."15 But it is also worth noting that our interest in
the relationship between Elizabeth and Henry Stanton and their
unusual marriage relates as much to our expectations of mar-
riage as to hers. We identify the unexcused absence of her hus-
band as an indicator of a violation of marital norms, but this
may have been much less true of a society which considered sep-
aration more appropriate than divorce. We appreciate Stanton's
comments which indicate a commitment to romantic love and a
highly idealized version of a marital relationship." 6 But her well
known essay, the Solitude of Self, indicates that she may well
have viewed marriage as an institution whose importance was
focused on children, and whose meaning for adults might be va-
rious, but which was not finally a solution to the issue of the
human condition in its largest sense.
The early narratives may be read as consistent with the
movement after he became the subject of a minor scandal concerning bonds
illegally taken from the customs house he directed. Stanton appeared to want
independence from him as well as a separate identity for herself, although she
never sought a divorce.
Id. (citations omitted).
114. E. STANTON, EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE 71-72 (1971).
115. That is, she was economically independent in that she neither needed his
money nor feared his misuse of her money.
116. The aspirational aspects of marriage may be evidenced by the language of Wil-
liam 0. Douglas (married four times) in Griswold:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in, living not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our
prior decisions.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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view that the purpose of marriage was delineated by various
functions and roles, and that divorce was a solution when diffi-
culties were so acute that the performance of those functions, or
the living in those roles, was impossible. Thus, the language is
intense and extreme; one talks of cruelty and misery. Situations
are intolerable. But we see also in the late nineteenth century,
the proposition that marriage had something first to do with
happiness, and second with romantic love, not only in its crea-
tion, but as a condition for its continued existence. This proposi-
tion underlies our current ideas of marriage.
2. Twentieth-century divorce narratives
In 1956, William Goode noted that "[a]ll societies recognize
that there are occasional violent, emotional attachments be-
tween persons of opposite sex, but our present American culture
is practically the only one which has attempted to capitalize
these, and make them the basis for marriage .... ,1117 More re-
cently, in a discussion of the models of family life, Herbert Ja-
cobs noted that not only has the companionate marriage become
dominant, but that "[t]he romantic ideal not only rules court-
ship but it also governs the criteria for continuing marriages." 118
The work on divorce published in the twentieth century em-
phasized the point that there is a distinction between the legal
grounds for divorce and the true reasons for the break-up of a
marriage. For example, in 1924 Mowrer wrote:
The purpose of this article is to show that the law does not
recognize as causes for divorce the natural causes of family dis-
integration. Thus our divorce laws become molds into which
the discord arising in family relations must be made to fit
before the state will sanction a discontinuance of that
relationship. 119
117. Goode, The Theoretical Importance of Love, 24 Am. Soc. REv. 38, 40-41 (1956).
That love has largely to do with the lover rather than the love-object, see W. LIPPMANN,
A PREFACE TO MORALS 310 (1931) (quoting Santayana). That love has altogether to do
with the lover, see 1 W. GOETHE, WILHELM MEISTER 202 (T. Carlyle trans. 1930) ("if I
have a touch of kindness for thee, what has thou to do with it?").
118. H. JACOBS, THE SILENT REVOLUTION 25 (1988).
119. Mowrer, The Variance Between Legal and Natural Causes for Divorce, 2 J.
Soc. FORCES 388, 389 (1924). See also Ross, The Significance of Increasing Divorce, in
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST (D. Rothman & S. Rothman eds.) ("In nineteen cases out of
twenty the marriage purports to be shattered by some flagrant wrong .... [Often] the
'cause' that figures in the record is a screen for some deep-seated irritant.").
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The legal grounds were typically a camouflage, or a fiction be-
cause the true grounds must, of necessity, be specific to a rela-
tionship. The actual grounds might be the legal grounds, but it
was not at all necessary that this should be true.120 Finally, in
the no-fault divorce system, the fiction was eliminated, so we are
allowed to keep to ourselves the true reasons without the need
for a mask of legal grounds. The true reasons, as some works
suggest, may be violations of the norms of companionate mar-
riage: intimacy, companionship, and sexual fulfillment.121
The narratives of the period of expanded expectations of
marriage see fault not in the specific evils identified by the fault
grounds, but in the failure of the love relationship. The diary of
Miriam Donaven, 122 apparently a product of the 1920's, is a
story of romantic love, but without the complexities introduced
by modern feminism, that is, women in the market competing
with their spouses. Miriam Donaven is prepared to base her life
in the love of her husband but cannot. A later narrative, Susan
Braudy's Between Marriage and Divorce, concerns, in part, a
development of this theme under the impact of a demand for a
separate identity.
a. The diary of Miriam Donaven: an early twentieth-cen-
tury companionate marriage. Eight years after her marriage,
Miriam Donaven, then divorced, killed her lover and herself.
Her diary was found in her apartment, the scene of the murder/
suicide. Mowrer writes: "The diary opens during the seventh
week of married life, December 1, 19-. Miriam Donaven is al-
ready beginning to find disillusionment in marriage." '23
December 1.-The past month has been one of happiness to
us both, and I would not write of what I did. Just a month ago
today I have been living in this dear fiat .... Every night for
over a week he [Alfred] has come home dead tired, crawled
right into bed and after kissing me dutifully, goes to sleep
with my head on his arm. One night there was no arm for my
120. The statutory enumeration of legal grounds may, of course, increase the possi-
bility that these factors will become actual grounds, as. the law communicates that these
things justify divorce. It also communicates that these things may be forgiven (condona-
tion) or ignored (no rule forces a divorce for grounds).
121. C. RIESSMAN, supra note 62.
122. E. MOWRER, supra note 29, at 230. Mowrer notes that "the cycle of events in
the diary of Miriam Donaven is a group phenomenon rather than an individual experi-
ence." Id. A reviewer noted that the lay reader would find the diary a "bit of life hot
with living." Zorbaugh, Book Review, 50 Naw REPUBLIC 280, 281 (1927).
123. E. MOWRER, supra note 29, at 231.
DIVORCE STORIES
head to rest on, and not even a good-night kiss, so I turned
over and cried myself to sleep. [Oh, I wish my husband knew
how much I want to be loved.] I tell him, but he does not real-
ize what I mean all the time, every minute he is with
me .... 124
Oh God, how will our life end? What are we coming to? Last
night Alfred was kind to me when I cried. I could not hold in
any longer and he quieted me and put my head on his bare
breast and kissed me. Oh, how thankful I was for that atten-
tion and of how I needed it and do now. He told me he wants a
pal, his little girl, and wife back again and misses her oh so
bad. Oh, God, when has that part of me gone? Is the fault
mine, his or ours? He says I have changed the last three weeks
in what way I can't understand because I feel right toward my
boy. Last week one night when he came home I cried and told
him I had been lonely all day and the Saturday before Easter
Sunday we kneeled and prayed to God to make us happy and
Easter he said would be Little Girl's day and every Sunday
thereafter. All that was less than three weeks ago, was his ideal
gone then? Well, while I was crying my heart out to God I
asked Alfred what he wished to do, if we could go on and he
suggested separation. All of a sudden I seemed to really know
what that would mean for me and I thought I would go mad. I
certainly am an unhappy woman with him now sometimes, how
should I feel without him?125
Mower analyzed the Donaven narrative in terms of the expecta-
tions of marriage:
Dominating the life of Miriam Donaven was the wish for re-
sponse. A husband to her was a man who loved one, caressed
one, and was attentive at all times. As a value he was the prod-
uct of romanticism. One went to him for response. But to Al-
fred a wife was one who gave herself to him sexually, and who
played the conventional role-cooked, kept house, mended his
clothes, etc. This conflict in attitudes seems to have been the
basis of the discord throughout their married life. 26
Mowrer considers the issue of work in the following terms:
One writer, in commenting on the diary, has made a great deal
of the fact that Miriam had no vocational qualifications. Her
career in life was dependent upon her sex appeal-a depen-
dence which became more marked, of course, after her separa-
124. Id.
125. Id. at 234.
126. Id. at 257.
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tion than during her life with Alfred. She did not like house-
work. She could not see how Alfred could respect her when she
had to clean the bathtub after him with her own hands. She
seems to have known little about cooking when they were first
married. Miriam tried several kinds of work; folding circulares,
working in department stores, china-painting, posing for a cor-
set company, etc. In none of these occupations was she particu-
larly adept, nor did she like any of them very well. She spent
considerable time drawing, but that did not give her response.
She was ambitious to become a motion-picture actress. But she
never really developed a vocation. As a result, much of her ef-
fort was expended in restless attempts to realize her romantic
ideal, to be loved all the time, fiercely, passionately. 127
The reasons for divorce, as Mowrer-analyzes them, are dif-
ferent from the legal grounds. Mowrer writes that finally "Alfred
agrees to give her cause of divorce.112 8 Later Miriam and her
husband separate and are finally divorced. The pattern is being
repeated with another man. Finally Miriam Donaven kills her-
self and her lover.
b. A contemporary divorce narrative. The divorce narrative
of the late twentieth century is in part about the failure of ro-
mantic love, but seems to be more about the collapse of mar-
riages under the strain of multiple demands.129 Susan Braudy's
life involved a marriage to a professor and an attempt to make a
professional life of her own. The marriage lasted six years.
MAY 5-This afternoon I exploded. I enjoyed the eruption af-
ter being careful not to reveal my tensions to Paul recently.
"I am not going to any more of those boring parties," I
shouted. "How dare you accept another invitation for me
when you know I don't like them? I find those people a total
waste of time."
My voice sounded harsh and self-pitying. "I don't have
any compulsion to go there. The only reason for these parties
is that someone is enjoying the public face of a private flirta-
tion. You can go there and flirt with Emily if you want, but
why drag me to watch?" There it was, out, the ugly, self-ter-
rorizing fantasy made into sounds, words. Part of me truly be-
lieved that if I. never said the words, the ideas would disap-
127. Id. at 259.
128. Id. at 250.
129. Alix Nelson read the diary as centrally about sexual boredom and infidelity.
Nelson, Between Marriage and Divorce, (Book Review) THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK
REVIEW, Nov. 9, 1975, at 24.
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pear just as my childhood fear of the dark, then of school,
then of millions of other pieces of my life had disappeared
after the initial panic.
And in recent years, it had been Paul who had assumed
the responsibility for brushing away these terrors, correcting
my perceptions of reality. "Go back there and ask him how he
put together the skit, don't let some public relations man
scare you away," he ordered me out of the house when I was
reporting for an article on an educational television show and
was banned from the studio. . . .He'd sit down fearlessly at
my typewriter and type out a paragraph. "No, no," I'd ex-
plain, and galvanized by his energy, but sure his beginning
wasn't right, I'd sit down to write. And emotionally, Paul had
been the interpreter too. "Just because Ann didn't return
your call doesn't mean she doesn't want to be your "friend,"
he'd say soothingly in New Haven. Or when I felt really out of
it at faculty parties where I believed everybody was doing
more interesting work than I was, he'd make a point of telling
me, "Al's wife thinks you're a dynamo-working at your tele-
phone company job and taking those writing classes, too."
Now he would come through once more and erase my
fears of the past two weeks. "Don't worry so much," he said
harshly, running his hands through his hair. I put my arms on
his shoulders from behind and said pleadingly, "Paul, do me a
favor and don't tell anyone about this conversa-
tion-including Emily." "Okay, okay, of course," he promised,
walking out of my hug. His words were only slightly soothing.
Since I have started lying to him, I can't really trust anything
he says to me. 3 '
The marriage ends in divorce, with Paul making a new life
with Emily, and Susan living as an unmarried professional wo-
man. As to the legal divorce itself, Susan "pushed Paul to do the
suing."'131 Whatever the formal basis for the divorce, the actual
problems relate to work and other people. 132 The failure, it is
suggested, is not of the people but of the institution.133
Susan Braudy writes of the account of her divorce: "This
130. S. BRAUDY, BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 115-16 (1975).
131. Id. at 232.
132. Braudy's account of her own affairs suggests relevance, in the traditional law,
of the idea that divorce is a remedy for the innocent spouse. On recrimination, see, e.g.,
Home v. Home, 72 N.C. 530 (1875). In Horne, a jury found both parties guilty of adul-
tery and the divorce was denied. "Both husband and wife are two miserable wretches,
and the case is too disgusting to be longer entertained by the court." Id. at 533.
133. S. BRAUDY, supra note 130, at 5.
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book is nonfiction, based on my diaries and memories. I have
changed the names of a few of the characters. Some of the reac-
tions I write about were overheated, but they represent my re-
sponses at the time.' i 4 The point here seems to be that her di-
ary is basically true. Moreover, it describes a common
experience, a point Mowrer suggested as to the Donaven diary.
Braudy writes: "I tell this story, my story, because its outline
and emotional content are common ones. In the ordinariness of
my own private feelings, I hope other women can see their own.
We are unsurprisingly not alone."' 3 5 The narrative is thus un-
derstood not as personal but as social. 136 Braudy is focused
throughout on the question of women and their attempt to find
meaning in existing institutions: "Sometimes I think it is not
that I and a growing number of women and men have failed at
marriage, but that the institution of marriage has failed us.' 137
Braudy quotes Margaret Mead: "[M]ost cultures honor concepts
which people publicly uphold but privately and shamefully fail
to live up to. [Mead] suggests marriage is such a concept."' 3
Neither Braudy's nor Donaven's diary deals extensively
with the issue of children. However, this issue is of some impor-
tance in modern marital situations. Years ago, Goode noted the
conflict between two norms here:
[M]uch of the verbal approval of the mother's working is likely
to be hollow in actuality. That is to say, within almost every
social group the working mother is under strong pressures to
take care of her children and to leave the job market. Her
claim that the extra salary is absolutely needed for survival is
viewed with considerable skepticism, even when the claim is
not openly rejected. This general disapproval becomes rela-
tively strong in precisely those middle-class strata where the
egalitarian notions are held most strongly, because in such
strata and groups the recent psychodynamic justifications for
child freedom, child affection, breast feeding, security in
mother love, etc. have become most fully accepted.139
Goode suggests that "all other role obligations are residual, com-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. At the same time, certain social issues are omitted. A reviewer noted that
Braudy is not concerned with the real life problem of divorced women with children, and
particularly economic problems. Nelson, supra note 129, at 24.
137. S. BRAUDY, supra note 130, at 5.
138. Id.
139. W. GOODE, WOMEN IN DIVORCE 209 (1965).
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pared to this, and must wait until those of mother are satis-
fied." '140 Clearly both men and women occupy several statuses.
However, "[c]ompared with other major statuses, that of mother
is more likely to be viewed as exclusive, other roles as
residual."' This means that "the legitimacy of nonmaternal re-
sponsibilities is questioned unless it can be shown that the ma-
ternal responsibilities themselves are being properly met; and
the clarity and moral force of this prescription are greater than
for her other statuses."1 4 2
All of this may still be true.
Even aside from motherhood, issues of competition between
the spouses, as the Braudy narrative indicates, are far from re-
solved. The problem of multiple loyalties, to individuals, work,
and home, suggests that the tensions between marriage and
friendship, or marriage and families, may be as great as the ten-
sion between marital and non-marital sexual relations. The rea-
sons for this are clear. The present definition of marriage as a
norm does not permit the possibility of other orderings of equal
intensity. 4 3 The model requires that even the demands of work,
friendship, and the extended family must yield-at the norma-
tive if not the practical level-to the demands of the marriage
and the world it creates. Certainly this is true for mothers, usu-
ally for wives and even at times for fathers and husbands. Paul,
in the Braudy narrative, said that "part of getting married...
is to give up other deep friendships' ' 44 and to say of someone
that he or she is married to work states a violation of a marital




143. See discussions of friendship in C. LEWIs, supra note 3, at 55-64 (1960). See
also Simmel:
For, friendship is a relation entirely based on the individualities of its ele-
ments, more so perhaps even than marriage: because of its traditional forms,
its social rules, its real interests, marriage contains many super-individual ele-
ments that are independent of the specific characters of the personalities in-
volved. The fundamental differentiation on which marriage is based, as over
against friendship, is in itself not an individual, but a species, differentia-
tion. . . .The modern, highly differentiated woman shows a strikingly in-
creased capacity for friendship and an inclination toward it, both with men
and with women.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMNIEL 138 (K. Wolf ed. & trans. 1950).
144. S. BRAUDY, supra note 130, at 220.
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understand "[t]he exclusion of all others"'45 in a fairly large
way.
c. A fictional divorce narrative. The Braudy narrative on
divorce, with its emphasis on the problem of an autonomous be-
ing within marriage, signals a problem with the idea of compan-
ionate marriage itself. This problem can be further illustrated by
a fictional narrative by Doris Lessing. 146 Like Stanton, Lessing
suggests that marriage could not answer all questions. Lessing's
story describes the perfect marriage of the Rawlings, an intelli-
gent couple which does things correctly. They are not too young
or inexperienced when they marry. They have the right number
and kind of children. The wife devotes herself to the family for
twelve years, only to find that she sees herself as having put her-
self on hold, in cold storage, in bondage to others. She now re-
quires time and space to herself. She therefore rents a hotel
room in which to be alone. (Her husband thinks-he almost pre-
fers, as against other possibilities-that the room is to be used
for a lover, so that the husband and wife with their respective
friends can make a civilized foursome). In that room, she kills
herself.
This narrative describes what we see as the humanely intel-
ligent contemporary marriage, and its inability to solve the
problem of ultimate meaning. Infidelity seems unimportant in
the sense that in its very normalcy it is preferred to other kinds
of estrangement. While earlier narratives were focused on per-
sonal, individual experience,'147 the Lessing story is a comment
on the costs of companionate marriage in general. 148
Lessing suggests that the failure of companionate marriage
is not about a failure of individuals, but rather about a failure of
the world companionate marriage creates. The Rawlings have
145. See Hyde v. Hyde, 1 L.R.-P. & D. 130, 133 (D. 1866). ("[M]arriage . . .may
... be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclu-
sion of all others.").
146. D. LESSING, To Room Nineteen, in STORIES (1980).
147. Linked to the idea of confessional literature, perhaps, as one reviewer suggested
about the Braudy diary.
148. The history of modern marriage suggests two contrasts, one between marriages
considered patriarchal and those considered companionate, another between marriages
understood as romantic, or total, and those which are (merely) comfortable or compan-
ionable. As to the second pair, where it was once thought that romantic marriages could
properly mellow into companionable ones, it is now possible to see that the companiona-
ble marriage, which exists as a background and may not be the largest part of the life of
either of the couple, can easily be judged a poor second to a real or even hypothetical
romantic alternative.
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everything. That everything, for the wife at least, is destructive
to her core. The view of marriage is suggested in the nightmare
figure of a man Susan Rawling projects. He "wants to get into
me and take me over. ' 149 It was her inner experience of compan-
ionate marriage, based on intelligence, good planning and appar-
ently perfect understanding.
Their life seemed to be like a snake biting its tail. Mat-
thew's job for the sake of Susan, children, house, and gar-
den-which caravanserai needed a well-paid job to maintain
it. And Susan's practical intelligence for the sake of Matthew,
the children, the house and the garden-which unit would
have collapsed in a week without her.
But there was no point about which either could say: "For
the sake of this is all the rest." Children? But children can't
be a centre of life and a reason for being....
Matthew's job? Ridiculous. It was an interesting job, but
scarcely a reason for living ....
Their love for each other? Well, that was nearest it. If
this wasn't a centre, what was? Yes, it was around this point,
their love, that the whole extraordinary structure revolved.
For extraordinary it certainly was. Both Susan and Matthew
had moments of thinking so, of looking in secret disbelief at
this thing they had created: marriage, four children, big
house, garden, charwomen, friends, cars . . . and this thing,
this entity, all of it had come into existence, been blown into
being out of nowhere, because Susan loved Matthew and Mat-
thew loved Susan. Extraordinary. So that was the central
point, the wellspring.
And if one felt that it simply was not strong enough, im-
portant enough, to support it all, well whose fault was that?
Certainly neither Susan's nor Matthew's. It was in the nature
of things. And they sensibly blamed neither themselves nor
each other.150
The sense of individual isolation, an isolation which cannot
be relieved by a social institution like marriage, is reminiscent of
late Stanton. Stanton had said that: "No matter how much
women prefer to lean, to be protected and supported, nor how
149. D. LESSING, supra note 146, at 411.
150. Id. at 397-98. The story can be read as an account of individual mental break-
down. (Perhaps, following Laing, insanity is an appropriate response to insane situa-
tions?) But it can also be read as an account of an individual unable to find justification
in and through institutions. There is some discussion of why the wife's experiences of
bondage to the collective is so painful while the husband, who is equally bound in a way,
does not experience it that way.
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much men desire to have them do so, they must make the voy-
age of life alone, and for safety in an emergency, they must know
something of the laws of navigation."15' For Stanton, it did not
matter "whether the solitary voyager is man or woman; nature,
having endowed them equally, leaves them to their own skill and
judgment in the hour of danger, and, if not equal to the occa-
sion, alike they perish.' '152
Women's narratives of divorce describe personal or existen-
tial pain. 5 3 There are, of course, other possible narratives: of
husbands, children, and extended family. That marriage involves
more than the couple, and more even than the couple and their
children, is plain. We see it best in the history of parental con-
sent, but we can also see its survival in the public nature of the
marriage ceremony and the sanction which one's presence at the
ceremonies gives to the marriage.
To begin with, these narratives must be found, read, and
then somehow used. Narrative scholarship suggests that is has
some relationship to law reform. But, at this point, we return to
some basic questions.
IV. NARRATIVE AND LAW REFORM
As indicated, this article does not intend to use narratives in
support of some particular law reform, but rather to comment
on the idea that narratives can be used in that way. The meth-
odological issue is, in effect, discussed with reference to the his-
tory of divorce. One problem, already outlined, is that narratives
may suggest varying reforms. Another is that we may not know
how to evaluate narratives. Narratives may also suggest the fur-
ther point that the problem is less the law than in the social
meaning of the legal act.
If the problem is less with divorce than with our under-
standing of divorce (built in turn on conceptions of marriage),
solutions might lie in directions somewhat different from those
typically raised. We might continue to insist on free or even uni-
lateral divorce, but revise our notions of what divorce implies for
151. CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES, supra note 18, at 247-48.
152. Id. at 248.
153. If anything, personal pain, according to the current view, is supposed to be
minimized so that divorces are simply messy now, no longer painful. Thus Carl Schnei-
der describes no-fault divorce: "There ought be no sense of guilt when a marriage doesn't
work, because there was simply a technical dysfunction .... " Schneider, Moral Dis-
course and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1853 (1985).
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the people involved. Our definitions of families might, for exam-
ple, assimilate divorce to death, so that family relations as a
whole could be maintained despite the absence of a party. Or
divorced spouses might continue on as parents and in-laws but
not as spouses. Another alternative is a cultural redefinition,
stressing long-term commitment and more restricted divorce in
some cases (typically those involving older women or young chil-
dren). We might then ask less of marriage, concluding, in effect,
that the various functions of marriage (e.g., companionship,
child-rearing, property arrangements) are in fact severable. Just
as "marriage" involves no particular, arrangement in terms of
property or household management, it would not involve neces-
sary arrangements in terms of cohabitation or companionship.
Thinking in social terms about families, rather than marriages,
and about the meaning rather than the fact of divorce, might
also change our views on legal remedies. We might find that pro-
posals to legally enforce support obligations or statutes permit-
ting grandparent visitation would become as important as pro-
posals addressing the marital connection between the couple.""
But the use of narrative to think through the issue of the mean-
ing of divorce may or may not involve official law.
What is the utility of narrative for reform of official law?
Somehow we must move from individual narrative to a specific
legal proposal. This raises some difficult general questions.
Part III of this article outlined some narratives and some
law, suggesting a correspondence, over time, between narrative
and the evolution of the official law of divorce. It did not, how-
ever, conclude which came first.15 Part III simply noted that
certain legal regimes concerning divorce are associated with, i.e.,
their values can be evidenced by, certain themes in personal nar-
154. See, e.g., Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoraliza-
tion, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1981); Scott, supra note 33 (regarding precommitment
mechanisms); Llewellyn, supra note 198, at 262 (divorce more difficult in later years). Cf.
Nineteenth century French Law cited in Stoijar, History of the French Law of Divorce, 1
INT'L J. OF L. & FAM. 3 (1989).
155. Llewellyn said long ago, "Society moulds and makes the individual; but indi-
viduals are and mould society. Law is a going whole we are born into; but law is a chang-
ing something we help remodel. Law decides cases; but cases make law. Law deflects
society; but society is reflected in the law." Llewellyn, supra note 45, at 1283. This essay,
described as "bizarre" in W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 194
(1973), makes plain the connection with the law of divorce and marriage itself. Moreover,
the piece stresses the importance of description. Llewellyn himself was concerned with
bourgeois marriage, while noting regional, religious and class variations. On Llewellyn as
a reader of Ellen Key, see infra note 198.
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rative. The power of narrative lies in its capacity to awaken us,
and then change us.156 Often we want to say that the narrative
shapes attitudes which shape the law. If so, this carries a heavy
responsibility. 157 Because we are appealing to something com-
plex and polyphonic,58 something whose emotional content is
understood to be high (and thus a problem for rational deci-
sionmakers), our standards for narrative as a source of any par-
ticular law reform must be clear.
What is gained from the narratives in part III that summa-
ries would not provide? Here, as an exercise, are summaries:
Eunice Chapman, in a histrionic public account, tells how
(for assorted grounds some of which are related, as she sees it, to
the crimes of the Shakers) she obtained a divorce and managed
to recover her children from the Shakers. Included in this narra-
tive is incidental information about the state of travel in early
nineteenth-century America. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in speech
which reflects her personal pain and disgust, describes how a
young friend of hers endured a desperately unhappy marriage to
a chronic drunkard 5 9 and lost him and all her children. Miriam
Donaven's diary records, in over-wrought language, her disap-
pointments in marriage. It demonstrates her lack of serious in-
terests, her infantile vocabulary, and her neurotic need for affec-
tion. Susan Braudy publishes a strong, easily recognizable story
of a modern marriage strained by extramarital relations on both
sides, and the stress of two careers.
Certainly, we could, in the manner of the historian, add a
few selected quotations and paraphrase the narratives. It would
not be necessary to abstract as was done above. Yet something
would still be missing. Clearly, if we are to evoke serious empa-
thy-and this is repeatedly stated to be the goal of narra-
tive-we require something more than exposure to the simple
outline of the narrative. Indeed, the entire movement to narra-
tive is resisting the tendency to abstract, to give the gist, the
point, the argument. As Aviam Soifer puts the issue:
"[L]iterature seems to thrive upon empathetic emanations from
156. See Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2442 (1989).
157. I have always read this as a major theme in Austen's novel, Persuasion.
158. On narrative generally, see the recent symposium, Legal Story Telling, 87
MICH. L. REV. (1989). See also Getman, Voices, 66 TEx. L. REV. 577 (1988); Yudoff, "Tea
at the Palaz of Hoon" The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEx. L. REV. 589 (1988).
159. Whose "silly sensual leer" is she really talking about, the psychohistorian
wonders.
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the characters portrayed; law's propensity is to reduce people to
stock figures, jammed into the narrow confines of a legal classifi-
cation system too often concerned only with those facts readily
containable within preexisting phrases, articulated by using a
standardized vocabulary.' 6 0
This brings us to the justification typically raised; narratives
are not merely art, they tell us something. This something is not,
as Milner Ball indicates, a matter of simply conveying informa-
tion. It is rather a question of moving us into other worlds.' 6 '
The suggestion is made that narratives are a kind of testimony;
they reveal things previously hidden or rejected, truths denied
by the main system, or perspectives ignored by the dominant
discourse. Frequently, what we find is those other worlds is pain.
But what is the relation between this pain and law reform?
First, of course, law is seen as a generalized and institionalized
source of the injury. Then there is the assumption that by feel-
ing another's pain (as against simply saying that there is in the
abstract somebody somewhere in pain) we-as readers turned
reformers-get closer to eliminating that pain. This may be true.
It may also be true, however, that if we can in any sense forget
our own pain, we can forget the pain of others.
Moreover, simply talking about pain-our own or that felt
by another--is not itself a pain-killer, though in certain
processes it is considered a precondition to pain-killing. 62 And
we are not often encouraged to admit that there is pain in the
world with which we choose not to identify. Presumably the king
in the account of Vashti felt a certain pain when he was embar-
rassed in front of his friends, 63 but this is discarded as, in effect,
the pain of the slave holder whose slaves are freed. And there
160. Soifer, Listening and the Voiceless, 4 Miss. C. L. REV. 319, 320 (1984) (describ-
ing literature, but the point is valid as to narrative generally). The present defenders of
narrative, whether as writers or as persons analyzing narrative for legal purposes, are not
the first people to make this argument, of course. See e.g., J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW (1976).
161. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1855
(1990).
162.
Since then, at an uncertain hour,
That agony returns,
And til my ghastly tale is told
This heart within me burns.
Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (used as the epigraph in P. LEVI, THE
DROWNED AND THE SAVED (1989)).
163. Does Vashti's nobility lie in the fact that she refuses to go to a faculty party?
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are also female victim stories with which we tend not to iden-
tify.16 4 When we say that no-fault requires this result, do we fail
to recognize their pain? Our sympathy is with the abandoned or
the newly impoverished individual, but not necessarily with the
claim to preservation of the marital status or possible law re-
forms based on that idea. As to this, our view, in common with
that of much of society, is that relationships are private, that
marriages must be allowed to end freely (which is to say finally
and unilaterally) and that the problem for the law is limited to
an equitable rearrangement of property and a reasonable guar-
antee of continued economic security for (typically) the home-
maker wife. If the women's pain is a necessary cost, then we
must explain why some pain is held to be necessary while other
pain is considered avoidable. Narrative will not do this work
itself.
There are also questions about the narrative of pain itself.
Its prime value is apparently that of testimony. There seem to
be questions, however, which we are not supposed to ask"6 5 be-
cause these questions, at least at certain times and in certain
contexts, are seen to blame the victim or demonstrate that one is
in the wrong, or that one has a serious failure of understanding.
It seems that we are sometimes asked to accept not only the fact
of pain, but also the account of etiology and the suggestion for
cure.
Do we assume that narratives have some relationship to
truth? Are they to be understood as testimony, and examined by
the conventional approaches, for example, of the legal rules of
evidence? 6 Or is the appropriate standard more like the stan-
dard for truth in art? With reference to Black Rain by Masuji
Ibuse, a novel about the bombing of Hiroshima, a reviewer ob-
served: "[W]e do not know whether Ibuse imagined this or
164. For example, the stories of women divorced in Bucholz v. Bucholz, 197 Neb.
180, 248 N.W.2d 21 (1976) (regarding claim that marriage involved a property right) or
Sharma v. Sharma, 8 Kan. App. 2d 726, 667 P.2d 395 (1983) (attempt to seek free exer-
cise exemption from divorce law for high caste hindu) who argued that they should not
be divorced and suffered substantially.
165. This relates to points made in Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LE-
GAL F. 115; and Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1989). For a presentation which both records questions about a narrative and offers an
argument against asking such questions, see P. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 50-51, 242 (1991).
166. For such an evaluation of biblical texts, see S. GREENLEAF, THE TESTIMONY OF
THE EVANGELISTS EXAMINED ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1918).
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whether it is truth; or rather, we know that it is true in the sense
that Ibuse convinces us in every word he writes that this is how
it was and this is how people endure."'1 7 We accept this in art.
We might accept it in certain scholarship.6 8 It is an issue we
cannot ignore.
The argument for narrative work assumes that narrative is
not only not trivial,' 69 but is even useful for law reform. This is
viable, however, only if the use of narrative (and particularly
narrative scholarship) is susceptible to analysis and judgment. 7 0
This, however, presents a variety of problems. For example,
it is clear that in a field dominated by language, we must deal
with the issues raised by modern critical techniques which reject
the notion of objective truth.171 One answer is that the proposi-
tion that all stories are partial is different from such proposi-
tions that all stories are false and no story is more reliable than
another. 172 But it seems that narrative scholarship itself rarely
discusses how to make these determinations. We tend to avoid
the issues by assuming the greater validity of the later story173
and by granting the victim's story the status of an expert's
testimony. 7
4
167. Tomalin, Book Review, Observer Rev., Mar. 14, 1971. (Do we want to analyze
how he convinces us?)
168. Historical scholarship is supposed to be about truth, though there can be a
question about how that truth is established and by what sort of thing it can be evi-
denced. See I. HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 33 (1975) (on the 15th century
attack on the donation of Constantine, a fraud proved by an argument that the Donation
is not the sort of thing that would have happened, rather than by using "evidence").
169. It may have a subject which is trivial by some standards but this is not itself a
problem. One can reject the standard, or adapt Gershom Scholem's comment that "non-
sense is always nonsense but the history of nonsense is scholarship" (of debated origin,
quoted in J. PELIKAN, THE MELODY OF THEOLOGY 224 (1988)).
170. See Ball, supra note 161.
171. And may also reject the idea that language has meaning. For a discussion of
this issue, see Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 226 (1988) (in context of consti-
tutional interpretation).
172. "To disclaim objective standards of truth is not to disclaim all value judg-
ments. We need not become positivists to believe that some accounts of experience are
more consistent, coherent, inclusive, self-critical, and so forth." Rhode, Feminist Critical
Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 626 (1990).
173. The convention is to automatically attribute authenticity or truth to the later
reading-not necessarily an analytic reading of one's life-but it is only a convention.
See also Averill, The Acquisition of Emotions During Adulthood in THE SOCIAL CON-
STRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 98, 114 R. Harrd ed. 1986) (discussing getting in touch with
one's feelings as being "not so much a process of discovery as it is an act of creation").
174. Perhaps the victim is an expert about that part of oppression which he/she
experienced. Thus a recent writer of a Holocaust book spoke of it as series of family
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The issues of normative implications of narrative-even
when they are explicit"'7 -raise other issues about the relation
between the idea and the speaker. One tradition insists that the
idea and the work stand apart from the speaker. 17 6 Another em-
phasis is on the speaker, an emphasis in which, in effect, insists
on narrative as a preliminary to normative conversation or
debate.
For example: why comment on Stanton's life and its influ-
ence on her ideas about divorce?177 For some, her life might be
used to test the validity of her ideas.18 For others, her life might
suggest the existence or non-existence of expert status in writing
about some ideas. In the political context, it might tell us some-
thing about the underlying biases at work. As has been noted,
"much (all?) scholarly work is at some level about ourselves."'179
But why do we assume that where we are coming from is defined
socially by race, class or gender rather than some highly individ-
ualized response to issues like race, class or gender? 18 0 The point
is not that life and work are unrelated. Particularly within femi-
nist theories, with their heavy emphasis on the experiential as-
pects of feminist thinking, we assume that Stanton's experiences
tragedies. P. WEBSTER, PfTAIN'S CRIME (1990). But the victim is not an expert as to the
whole.
175. Which often they are not. See Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. - (forthcoming 1991).
176. See Kennedy, supra note 165.
177. See text accompanying note 113.
178. If she really believed them, she would have divorced her husband-unless ex-
cused. Since she did not do it, she didn't believe them and [therefore?] they are less
likely to be true? See O'Neill's discussion of Havelock Ellis. W. O'NEILL, supra note 51,
at 124-26 (challenging the credentials of Ellis as a man unable to make a success of so
universal an institution as marriage). This misses that while the term marriage is univer-
sal, the institution is not; that unhappy experiences may qualify people to offer critiques.
As to Braudy, it was noted that her feminism was unconvincing since she "ends the book
launching her career as a free lance writer with money borrowed from her husband."
Nelson, supra note 129, at 25. Is the evil here the loan (dependence) or the source of the
loan (Cinderella waiting for her prince). Is female dependence to be celebrated as an
aspect of the different voice (so that the desire for independence becomes something to
be rejected as a part of the male ego trip)? For a hard view on the necessity of indepen-
dence, see J. SMITH, MISOGYNIES (1989).
179. Resnik & Heilbrun, Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J.
1913, 1920 (1990) (discussing the problem of revising the canon). For a feminist discus-
sion which largely accepts the traditional canon, see Nochlin, supra note 36.
180. R. LAING, THE FAcTs OF LIFE (1976) (what others call me is their map of me;
what I call myself is my map: where is the territory?). Is there a core "I" under the many
ways to say "I" in Japanese. Note also that things highly specific to individual families,
e.g., family pride, may be as important as any other social identification. See D. DAICHEs,
Two WORLDS 10 (1989).
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and choices in her private life reflect in some way the program
she argued for in her political career. The point is that that re-
flection could cover many relationships, most of them unknown
to us and some perhaps hardly known to her. One may argue for
a range of public choices which one has no intention of making
one's self; as one may condemn behavior in which one engages in
privately, or even publicly. Finally, the work or idea stands or
falls by itself.181 A bad person can have a good idea, and a good
person a bad one. Our favorite poets may have been unpleasant
people.
The insistence that we tell where we are coming from before
we offer our beliefs suggests that our beliefs are shaped by our
situations in a more direct and linear way than is likely to be the
case.8 2 If we get to the point of saying that whatever we do is
shaped entirely by our individual backgrounds, directly or by
opposition, transformation or creative refining, ultimately we
have not said much. Race, class, gender, religion, psychological
history are blended in the individual in ways beyond calculation.
But it may be that if we choose to tell our life story it is not
because we see the telling as a validation of the ideas so much as
that we believe the narration provides a credential. We were
there. (Though sometimes people who weren't see the truth
more clearly). 8 3 At other times, the telling of the life seems to
have something to do with bias and self-interest.8 8 But self-
serving is, again, a dimension apart from right or even interest-
181. Martha Fineman makes the same point-that what is centrally relevant is the
argument not the speaker-and urges that this is so in part because a contrary emphasis
gives a false idea of the significance of the individual in relation to social.or political
problems. Fineman, Challenging Law, , 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 41, - (1990).
182. There seems no point in trying to enumerate the various ways in which one's
work, one's product, or expression might be "about" oneself.
183. This would be the strong version of the outsider claim. See Merton, Insiders
and Outsiders, 78 AM. J. Soc. 9, 31 (1972). Merton notes that Simmel is the source of
aphorism: We don't have to be Caesar to understand him; but note Simmel's very special
sensitivity. He was a man who could discuss the moral problems of people with "psycho-
logically fine ears," those who suddenly and involuntarily received insights into other
people which those others would prefer to keep private. Discretion, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
GEORG SIMMEL 323 (K. Wolff ed. 1950) [hereinafter SocIoLOGY]. It is one thing for such a
person to claim value in the outside perspective. Quite another for that perspective to be
used as a sole source by those whose empathetic capacity is either not known, or known
to be fairly limited.
184. Thus Voltaire comments on Montesquieu's defense of the sale of offices in
monarchies (though not despotisms): "[W]e can forgive him: his uncle purchased [an
office], and left it to him. After all we find the man. No one of us is without his weak
points." MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWs 69 n.y. (T. Nugent trans. 1975).
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ing.185 And again, reduction of the relevant categories to race,
class, and gender is clearly inadequate. 18 6
These, it seems, are generic problems about narrative and
law reform. But narrative has a specific utility-in the context of
legal pluralist approaches-a subject explored in Part V, again
in the context of divorce.
V. NARRATIVE AND LEGAL PLURALISM
In discussing narrative and law reform to this point, it is
worth noting as a significant aside that we have been using too
narrow a definition of law. Narratives suggest that other unoffi-
cial legal systems, e.g., religious legal systems, operate in peo-
ple's lives and deserve attention. Typically, we think of these
legal systems as "law" in the sense that they are formal, and
emanate from an authority (albeit not the state). Religious legal
systems are the model of such alternative systems.
Immigrants brought with them not only traditions of food,
clothes and music, but also traditions of law. Some of this law
was religious, ancient and well articulated. Religious legal sys-
tems coexisted and were used by adherents of particular reli-
gious groups within the American legal system. Some of these
systems involved institutions foreign to the main system.'87 Con-
ditional divorce in Jewish law is one example. The New York
Times, in 1905, published this story:
NEWARK, Jan. 15.-Following an ancient Jewish custom,
Mrs. Hattie Sobel has received a conditional divorce from Sa-
muel Sobel, a member of the Anshe Israel Congregation, who
is dangerously ill with paralysis at his home, at Morton and
Prince Streets. In the event of Sobel's death Mrs. Sobel will
185. We work in a field in which wrong but interesting is a legitimate category. This
is not true in all fields.
186. There must be those, in both victim or oppressor categories, by race or class,
who are unable to identify their own individual stories with the conventional stories of
their group.
On the fluctuating aspects of (ascribed) identifications, see Einstein, quoted in
Merton, supra note 183, at 28: "If my theory of relativity is proven successful, Germany
will claim me as a German and France will declare that I am a citizen of the world.
Should my theory prove untrue, France will say that I am a German and Germany will
declare that I am a Jew."
On problems of inclusion/exclusion generally, see M. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIF-
FERENCE (1990).
187. For discussion of the interaction of the American legal system and religious
legal system in American family law, see Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay
on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1988).
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be at liberty to remarry, but if he recovers the divorce will
become void.
The ceremony of divorce was performed in the presence
of two rabbis and several other witnesses, and was intended to
serve as a relief to Mrs. Sobel, if she becomes a widow, from
certain religious requirements to which she would otherwise
be subjected, among them a divorce from her husband's
brother. The ceremony was performed at Sobel's request. His
brother lives in Brooklyn.' s
The Jewish law of marriage and divorce is different from
the state law in several respects. To begin with, religious law
permits divorce without specific fault grounds. Then, it assumes
levirate marriage. (Note the reference to divorce from her hus-
band's brother.)' s Finally, it includes the idea of conditionality
in a divorce decree. The New York Times includes the story in
its pages as a piece of ethnography, as it might report some
other odd event or ritual. The Sobel divorce indicates that par-
ticular groups within American society live in a domestic system
operating within the official state system. Some efforts at law
reform may therefore be directed at that system.
The sub-groups which think about divorce in their own way
vary from each other. 90 They may be religious minorities in the
sense that they are not mainstream Protestant, or they may in-
deed reflect main stream Protestants as a minority. A nine-
teenth-century writer saw Christians as one such group, paral-
leled by another group, skeptics, who used civil divorce:
188. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1905, at 5, col. 2. See generally Aranson, Divorces on Con-
dition, 3 THE GREEN BAG 381 (1891). Conditional divorce might solve the current "get"
problem. Regarding conditional divorce, see L. Epstein, Adjustment of the Jewish Mar-
riage Laws to Present Day Conditions, in 35 PROCEEDINGS OF THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY
227 (1935) (conditional divorce at the time of the marriage is "halakacally sound, but
very impractical," id. at 231). For a review of objections based on religious law, see M.
MEISELMAN, JEWISH WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 106-15 (1978). For a discussion of the "get"
issue, see Pfeffer & Pfeffer, The Agunah in American Secular Law, 31 J. CHURCH & ST.
487 (1990).
See K. SIMON, BRONX PRIMITIVE: PORTRAITS IN A CHILDHOOD 47 (1983) (narrative of a
culture in which despite the availability of divorce, "the Jewish women were as firmly
imbedded in their marriages as the Catholic").
189. See Deut. 25:5-6. On Polygamy in Jewish Law see B. MEIZINGER, JEWISH LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 28-32 (1987) (describing rabbinic ban on polygamy in the
West).
190. For another approach to religious divorce, see E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, ZION
IN THE COURTS 322-31 (1988) (discussing Mormon divorce). Note that it is also possible
to conceive marriage as neither for life nor permitting divorce. See S. HAERI, THE LAW OF
DESIRE: TEMPORARY MARRIAGE IN IRAN (1989) (temporary marriage for specified period of
time). See also D. PEARL, A TEXTBOOK ON MUSLIM LAW 75-76 (2d ed. 1979).
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Marriage is, among Christians, a contract for life, involving a
vow before God. The law has no authority to annul this com-
pact. Let it stand guarded by the command, "Those whom God
hath joined together let no man put asunder." Let the skeptics
have their own system. A civil contract, elastic as necessary,
could be drawn by each State.191
The group-subplot is not, however, the only sub-plot visible
in American family law in the sense that normative ideas about
family life are not only derived from religious or minority legal
systems. It is possible that in the United States the traditional
conception of family law as mandatory 92 (like the criminal law)
has been broken down, and that family law is understood, not as
the instrument of enforcement of the norm of the good life, but
rather as the vehicle for exploration of the question what is the
good life.193 Not knowing how to shape marriage collectively, we
return to the notion of marriage as a contract, governed by its
own law. But this emphasis first on the individual and the good
life, and second on contract-the law of the parties-may raise
more general questions regarding narrative and law.
The proposals for reforming the law typically assume that
we know what the law is; yet this may not be the case in divorce
law. The internal orderings of marriage are such that the rules
for their dissolution are in one dimension not really known.
Thus, we reach the use of narrative urged by Leon Pe-
trazycki, when he said we should use stories as tests of our own
legal experiences so that we would better know our own sense of
duty or obligation and our own sense of when another party had
a claim on us. 94 In Petrazycki's version of law, we would be
comparing our own individual law with the law of the outside
society or of any sub-group.
191. Lee, Final Words on Divorce, 50 N. AM. REV. 263, 264 (1890).
192. Gorecki, Moral Premises of Contemporary Divorce Laws: Western and East-
ern Europe and the Untied States, in MARRIAGE & COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY So-
CIETIES 124 (J. Eekelaar & S. Katz' eds. 1980).
193. The most liberal divorce regime does not require parties to divorce. On family
law as an overarching scheme within which people seek their individual good life, see
Markovitz, Family Traits (Book Review), 88 MICH. L. REV. 1734, 1740-41 (1990) (review-
ing M. GLENDON, TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE LAW AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989)).
194. On Petrazycki, see Weisbrod, supra note 2 and work cited there. We could, for
example, return to the issue of Vashti's narrative, and compare hers to the narratives of
the others in her world: the king, the ministers, and ultimately, to the official legal sys-
tem and our own legal systems.
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The first point is that each marriage has its own rules.195
Thus Sumner wrote:
The definition of marriage consists in stating what, at any time
and place, the mores have imposed as regulations on the [time-
less] relation's existence and the reproduction of the spe-
cies .... It has no structure. Each pair, or other marital com-
bination, has always chosen its own "ways" of living within the
limits set by the mores.196
Translating this idea into legal terms, it could be said that
each marriage has its own individual grounds for divorce within
the official state law of divorce. This is not a new perspective. In
1911, Ellen Key wrote that "[i]n the ideas of the Church, the
incapacity for marriage of one party freed the other from the
duty of fidelity. 1 9 7 Along parallel lines,
it will be equally evident that the same right exists to dissolve
a marriage which has remained unconsummated in a spiritual
sense; and there may be just as many possibilities in the capac-
ity to fulfil the spiritual claims of marriage as there are men
and women; therefore also just as many causes of divorce.19
This approach is also suggested by Petrazycki's description of
each family as its own legal field:
[F]rom the point of view of the psychological theory of law as
imperative-attributive experiences, family and intimate domes-
tic life (regardless of whether or not there are between those
participants any bonds officially recognized) is a broad and pe-
culiar legal world which is awaiting investigation: a legal world
with innumerable legal norms, obligations, and rights indepen-
dent of what is written in the statutes, and solving thousands
of questions unforseen therein.199
195. These rules may include rules about what may or may not be done, or dis-
cussed or acknowledged. They may be rules about controlling fictions. As Simmel noted,
there is utility in the reserves and discretion of marriage. SOCIOLOGY supra note 183, at
326-29. We pretend to others and perhaps to ourselves that we are living according the
norm, which itself rejects pretense.
196. W. SUMNER, FOLKWAYS § 364 (1959) (noting that the family-not marriage-is
the real institution).
197. E. KEY, LovE AND MARRIAGE 321 (1911).
198. Id. at 322. See Llewellyn, Behind the Law pf Divorce H, 33 COLum. L. REv. 249,
251 n.4 (1933) (regarding his mother (conservatively acting, but radically thinking) and
Ellen Key). Ellen Key is called "conservative" in that she stressed love and motherhood;
"radical" in that she believed in free divorce and motherhood for single women. On Ellen
Key generally, see N. Corr, supra note 64, at 46-49.
199. L. PETRAZYcK, LAW & MORALITY 68 (1955). See also, Weisbrod, supra note 2.
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Where each marriage has its own grounds for divorce, and each
individual has his or her own sense of the proper grounds for
divorce, the corresponding umbrella of state law is no-fault
divorce.200
VI. CONCLUSION
"The individual does not go about merely going about his
business," 0' 1 Goffman once wrote. "Rather, he individually goes
about trying to sustain a viable image of himself in the eyes of
others.' 20 2 Our identities-constructed in so many ways and of
so many affiliations-often include "married" or "unmarried" as
a critical part.203 A spouse, and even a particular kind of spouse
(e.g., a status wife), has critical importance in the social and con-
textual aspects of marriage, which is a highly public and, in va-
rying degrees, a private relationship.20 4 To the extent that it is
200. This might be restricted by contract:
A variety of binding precommitment options would, of course, theoretically be
possible. The most extreme would be a legal prohibition against divorce. Like
Ulysses, the married individual would be irrevocably bound to the original
choice. In terms of precommitment analysis, a no-exit rule would make the
inconsistent short-term preference unavailable (theoretically), forcing the indi-
vidual to abide by the commitment. Less extreme precommitment mechanisms
could impose costs on the decision to divorce and directly or indirectly support
the choice to continue in the marriage. A couple could agree before marriage to
impose economic penalties, benefiting the spouse or children, on the partner
seeking divorce. Some precommitment mechanisms would impose costs on the
decision to divorce, while at the same time discouraging impulsiveness. An
agreement or a legal rule requiring mandatory delay before divorce (a two- or
three-year waiting period, for example) would discourage impulsive divorce
and provide sufficient opportunity for a reconciliation. A similar effect would
result from an agreement to submit to counseling, mediation, or arbitration, or
a requirement of psychological evaluation of the children to assess the proba-
ble effect of divorce.
Scott, supra note 33, at 43-44 (footnotes omitted).
201. E. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS 1I1 PUBLIC 185 (1971).
202. Id.
203. Minow, Identities, 3 Y.AE J. L. & HUMANITIES 315, 326-29 (1991). Note particu-
larly discussion of finding room for a private self within the social identity.
204. It is the public and official aspect of marriage which creates the contrast to
friendship. We are not asked to register our friendships unless we are trying to set them
up as marriages. (Though, as Avi Soifer reminds me, we may choose sometimes to publi-
cally record them.) Our friendships exist and change according to their own rules and
sanctions. Note also the distinction between "consort" and "companion." Though identi-
fied, supra note 104, as a single role, this role may in fact be varied,-i.e., is emphasis
placed on consort or companion aspects?-long a public/private line.
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public, it has a clear relation to official law, which deals with
public relationships and their social implications.205
We increasingly see the social cost of divorce20 in the way
we, as a culture, have structured it, and a new interest in "com-
mitment" is evident in the law reviews.20 7 That discussion how-
ever has tended to neglect the issue of re-thinking the institu-
tion to which we are seeking commitment. 208 We are often
concerned about divorce because of its impact on children. More
broadly, we are sometimes concerned because of its impact on
social order. This concern relates back to our conception of mar-
riage: "If love and marriage are seen primarily in terms of psy-
chological gratification, they may fail to fulfill their older social
function of providing people with stable relationships that tie
them into the larger society. ' 20 9 Some years ago, Margaret Mead
(three-times divorced) commented that while marriages may be
broken, and very likely would be, given the demands being made
on that institution, families should not be. She pointed to the
need for new kinship terms and argued for a new extended fam-
ily.21 0 The same point could be made if we were centrally con-
cerned about the impact of divorce on grandparents. A part of
what Mead asked for-no-fault divorce-we did achieve, but
205. In part, as Lawrence Friedman suggests, this is due to the effect of marriage on
property ownership. Friedman, Rights of Passage, 63 OR. L. REV. 633 (1984). We want to
identify ownership and inheritance rights. It is still true, as Friedman once noted, that
family law is adjunct to the law of succession. L. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 150 (1984).
At the same time, however, we might note that the state adjudication of property is not
the only adjudication possible. E. P. Thompson provides a striking description of a Cath-
olic family "over-watching their [forfeited] ancestral lands" for two centuries. E. THOMP-
SON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 102 (1975).
206. That is, we see it more the way Europeans did:
[W]here a European regards the rupture of a marriage as producing social disorder
and the loss of a capital of joining recollections and experiences, an American
has rather the impression that 'he is putting his life straight', and opening up
for himself a fresh future. The economy of saving is once again opposed to that
of squandering, as the concern to preserve the past is opposed to the concern
to make a clean sweep in order to build something tidy, without compromise.
D. DE ROUGEMONT, LOVE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 293 (1983).
207. See Scott, supra note 33; Bartlett, supra note 33.
208. We would not be the first culture to have defined an institution in such a way
as to make it difficult, if not impossible, to meet all of its requirements. See R. BENEDICT,
supra note 49.
209. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART 85 (1985). But here our problem may be the idea that divorce dissolves families,
where in law, at least, it only dissolves marriages.
210. Mead, Double Talk About Divorce, REDBOOK, May 1968, at 47. See also Garfin-
kel, Not Exactly the Best Man, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 14, 1990, at 24.
143]
196 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1991
without the change in attitudes and social forms which might
have limited the damage.
Official law itself has a role in shaping social expectations,21'
though its actual effective power is unclear. Moreoever, while
models of marriage change, it seems that the cultural ideas we
have are not free of ambiguity. Marriage for life, for example,
remains as an aspiration despite other demands simultaneously
made of marriage. Conceivably we should work on a new legal
definition of marriage, but we should be clear that whatever our
legal definition, it will stand on social definitions.
Narrative provides access to our social definitions. But nar-
ratives have problems. Partiality is one weakness. Complexity
and multiplicity of narrative lines-in some ways the strength of
narrative-is another, particularly important when we consider
narrative and law reform. We cannot tell exactly just what a
story is saying. But through the examination of many narratives,
we can understand the range and nature of relationships which
state law should (and perhaps should not) protect. For those
concerned with law and narrative, it is true that one question
focuses on which voice the law shall identify as its own. 212 If offi-
cial law is viewed as a framework, rather than as a directive, and
if the existence of different ordering systems in a single society
is stressed, it becomes plain that this is not the only question.
211. On the expressive/educational function of law see M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987) (discussing the idea that law has itself a role in shaping
cultural understandings). See also Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family
Law, 22 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 991 (1989).
212. "While narrative jurisprudence may do a beautiful job of bringing to the fore-
ground the pathos of tragic nature of human experience . . . the real challenge for the
narrativists is to justify the violence of the law absent a clear source of moral consensus
about the various narratives available." Duncan, Narrative Jurisprudence: The Remys-
tification of the Law, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 105, 113 (1989).
